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Abstract 
 This dissertation presents two essays dealing with corporate equity transactions.  
The first essay concerns an equity issuing transaction, the initial public offering (IPO), 
and specifically lockups, which restrict sales by pre-IPO shareholders.  We improve 
upon the methodology for testing theory related to lockup length through the use of a 
multinomial logit as well as explore the reasons for and implications of multiple lockup 
agreements.  We find that multiple lockups are associated with dual class equity 
structures, high book-to-market values, and more secondary shares offered.  Offerings 
that include multiple lockups are more likely to deviate in (weighted average) length 
from the typical 180 day lockup term.  Additionally, we are the first to associate lockup 
decisions with long run stock performance. 
 The second essay addresses a corporate equity reducing transaction, the 
accelerated share repurchase (ASR).  In an ASR, the repurchasing firm receives 
substantially all of the shares subject to the repurchase immediately instead of over a 
longer period of time as in an open market repurchase (OMR).  In this second essay, 
we investigate whether the immediacy of the ASR allows the firm to increase earnings 
per share by distributing earnings over fewer shares, and indeed we find that firms that 
would be expected to fall two or more cents shy of median earnings expectations are 
very significantly more likely to elect an ASR as compared to an OMR.  In contrast, 
those firms that would be expected to exceed earnings by two or more cents are weakly 
significantly less likely to elect an ASR.  Further, the form of repurchase does not impact 
earnings performance in the four quarters subsequent to a repurchase.  Despite the 
higher abnormal returns associated with the announcement of an ASR, the market does 
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not appear to be able to tell at the time of announcement whether the repurchase is 
manipulative.  In the long run, manipulative repurchasers perform more poorly than non-
manipulative repurchasers, but perform better than those firms that miss expectations.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Initial Public Offerings 
 While firms are able to generate equity financing through sources such as the 
founders, angel investors, and venture capital, the general public cannot contribute 
equity capital until the firm conducts it’s initial public offering (IPO).  The decision to 
undertake an IPO brings with it a number of potential benefits to the firm beyond the 
obvious benefit of raising capital although that is certainly a major consideration.  Being 
publically traded allows the firm to establish a market value for its shares, allows pre-
IPO insiders to diversity their holdings by selling firm shares in a more liquid public 
market, drastically increases the ownership base of the firm, permits pre-IPO investors 
to cash out and realize a return on their early investment, and eases future acquisitions 
among other reasons.  In their survey of CFOs of IPO firms, Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
find that the desire to ease future acquisitions is the most important motivation for IPO 
with establishing a market value as the second greatest reason, and firm reputation 
enhancement is the third most compelling reason for going public. 
However, an IPO is not without its costs.  Beyond the direct costs paid to 
underwriters; in going public, the firm must conform to the additional legal requirements 
for a public firm, which represents an ongoing cost for the firm.  Also, there are the 
opportunity costs required of the time spent by management in navigating the IPO 
process.  Additionally, public firms must make periodic disclosures that are not required 
of a private firm, which could potentially relay valuable information to competitors.   
The cost of IPO that is perhaps most extensively covered in the literature is that 
of IPO underpricing.  IPO underpricing, the difference between the IPO offer price and 
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the first day’s closing price, averaged 18.8% over the 1980-2001 period although this 
figure varies over time (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  This underpricing essentially 
represents money left on the table by the issuing firm.  Had the offer been priced at the 
price at which the shares closed, the firm would have received a substantially greater 
infusion of capital.   
 A number of possible explanations for this underpricing have been proposed.  
Rock’s (1986)  “winner’s curse” posits that two broad classes of investors exist, 
informed and uninformed investors.  In his model, there are too few informed investors 
to fully subscribe to an offering. In overpriced offerings, informed investors will shy away 
from buying leaving the uninformed to purchase all the shares.  In attractive 
(underpriced) offerings, informed investors will bid for shares, reducing the allocation 
available for the uninformed.  The uninformed investors will receive a large allocation of 
poor offerings while their allocation of good offerings is relatively sparse creating 
negative returns for the uninformed.  As such, offerings must on average be 
underpriced to allow the uninformed to at least break even and ensure their continued 
participation in the IPO markets.   
 Alternatively, IPO underpricing may be a mechanism by which investors are 
incented to reveal their private information regarding the issuing firm’s value.  In 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the book building process in which the offer’s underwriter 
devises an initial price range and gauges interest from potential investors can help with 
this information production.  Firms with relatively low bids are allocated fewer shares 
than those that bid at the top of the range or higher.  In this manner, firms whose private 
information leads them to believe the offering to be worth more are incentivized to 
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reveal this information through aggressive bidding to receive a larger allocation.  Still, 
the offering must be underpriced for this information revelation mechanism to be 
incentive-compatible to investors. 
 Signaling is yet another possible information asymmetry based explanation for 
the underpricing phenomenon.  In Welch’s (1989) version, firms have superior 
information regarding their value.  High value firms underprice their IPO as a signal of 
quality to investors so that the firm can obtain favorable pricing in future equity offerings.  
When combined with imitation costs, the costs of underpricing induce low quality firms 
to self identify.  Chemmanur (1993) also gives a signaling based explanation for 
underpricing.  In his formulation, high and low quality firms are pooled.  However, high 
quality firms underprice to compensate investors for their information production costs.  
This information production then leads to higher valuations for further offerings by the 
high quality firms. 
 Moving away from information-based explanations, the allocation of shares to 
either encourage or discourage monitoring by outside shareholders has been given as a 
reason for underpricing.  Stoughton and Zechner (1998) propose that underwriters 
ration shares to individuals on behalf of the issuer so that the firm captures the benefits 
of improved monitoring by institutional investors.  In contrast, Brennan and Franks 
(1997) find that underpricing is used to ensure oversubscription, allowing the firm to 
ration shares and reduce the block size of new shareholders.  As such management is 
less susceptible to outside monitoring and changes in control. 
In an IPO two types of shares can be offered.  The first type, primary shares, is 
issued by the firm itself with the proceeds from sale accruing to the firm.  In contrast, 
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secondary shares are sold not by the firm but by pre-IPO shareholders.  As such, the 
shareholder receives the value of these shares and the capital of the firm is not 
increased by their sale.  Over the period 1980-2001, 56.6% of offerings were purely 
primary offerings while the rest contain secondary shares.  Of those offerings with 
secondary shares, the average offering was 72% primary shares (Brau et al., 2007).   
 Field and Hanka (2001) find that over the period from 1988-1997, 33% of the 
post IPO shares are sold in the offering leaving over two-thirds of the post IPO shares in 
the hands of pre-IPO shareholders.  As such, it is common for the IPO underwriting 
agreements to contractually prohibit many of these pre-IPO shareholders from selling 
these shares for a specified amount of time.  These agreements, called lockups, are the 
focus of our first essay.  
1.2 Payout Policy 
 The ways in which the firm distributes its free cash flows (FCF), that is those 
cash flows generated from operations that exceed those funds reinvested in the firm, 
form the basis of the payout policy decision and its corresponding literature.  Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) presents the famous dividend irrelevance proposition.  Under the 
assumptions of perfect markets, rational behavior, and perfect certainty, the authors 
demonstrate that payout policy has no bearing on firm value, “given investment policy”.  
In this setting, for a given level of investment, total payout for a period is simply equal to 
the period’s FCF.  While this analysis presents a convenient result, the assumptions 
needed to achieve this convenient conclusion are quite restrictive and not reflective of 
the prevailing circumstances of the non-theoretical world.  If for instance, management 
were to choose to exchange dividends for sub-optimal investments or to fail to render 
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the full FCFs to shareholders, firm value is impacted by these payout policy decisions 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2008).   
 The introduction of asymmetric information further complicates the payout 
decision.  Under the framework of Myers and Majluf (1984), firm managers hold 
superior information relative to outside investors, and this super knowledge is known by 
both managers and investors.  This information asymmetry creates the famous “pecking 
order” in which internal financing of investment opportunities is preferable to external 
financing.  This preference for internal financing would indicate a need for the firm to not 
fully payout FCF as realized as in Miller & Modigliani but to retain “slack” to fund future 
positive net present value (NPV) opportunities. 
 Unfortunately, Jensen (1986) challenges the wisdom of cash retention due to the 
agency conflict between investors and management.  Because management doesn’t 
fully bear the costs of sub-optimal decision making, it can be to their benefit to engage 
in activities such as empire-building or the taking of perquisites.  In this case, paying out 
FCF through dividends or repurchases reduces the ability of management to 
mismanage the firm’s funds and reduce shareholder value. 
 However, Jensen argues that debt is a more effective disciplinary mechanism 
than payout policy because dividends are not an obligation as are interest payments 
and are subject to reduction at management’s discretion.  In contrast to this perceived 
weakness of payout policy, dividends are notoriously sticky.    Lintner (1956) notes that 
the dividend decision begins with whether a change to the previous dividend is 
desirable.  Only after the desirability of a change is determined is the rate of change 
decided.  Brav et. al (2005) report that, in their survey of chief financial officers and 
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treasurers, 94% of firms try to avoid dividend reductions while 90.1% try to maintain a 
smooth stream of dividends.   
 Given the professed tendency to avoid dividend reductions, it may seem counter-
intuitive that 66.5% of firms in 1978 paid dividends while only 20.8% of firms were 
dividend payers in 1999 (Fama & French, 2001).  Fama and French attribute this overall 
decline in dividend payers to two primary factors.  First, following 1978, there is a large 
number of new listings of the firms which are characteristic of non-dividend payers (i.e. 
small, low earnings, and/or high growth opportunities).  Additionally, firms that have 
never paid dividends become less likely to being doing so after 1978.  
 While dividends were once the preeminent payout method, share repurchases 
became much more prominent in the 1980’s.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that 
repurchase expenditures grew from 4.8% of earnings in 1980 to 41.8% in 2000.  They 
posit that firms began to use repurchases as a substitute for increases in dividends.  
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) link the repurchase decision to the 
permanence of the cash to be returned to shareholders.  More sustainable operating 
cash flows tend to be returned in the form of dividends while temporary cash flows are 
paid out through repurchase, which reflects the contrast in the stickiness of dividends 
and the flexibility offered by open market repurchases. These open market repurchases 
have tended to be the dominant method of repurchase (Peyer & Vermaelen, 2005); 
however, beginning in the early 2000’s, a relatively new form of repurchase, the 
accelerated share repurchase, began to gain importance.   It is this newer form of 
repurchase and more specifically its potential ability to affect earnings per share that we 
explore in the second essay.  
 7 
Chapter 2. Initial Public Offering Lockups 
2.1 Introduction 
 When a firm makes a public equity offer, the underwriter of the offer typically 
requires certain existing shareholders to refrain from selling their shares or securities 
that can be converted into shares or entering into a transaction which would in effect do 
so for a specified period of time following the equity issuance. These agreements 
between firm insiders and underwriters, lockups, are extremely common with Karpoff, 
Lee, and Masulis (2013) finding that over the 1996-2006 period 96.6% of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) include a lockup provision while 93.8% of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) over the period include the feature. In our sample spanning 2000-2012, all firms 
that met our screening requirements included a lockup agreement. For IPOs, 
information regarding the number of shares subject to the lockup agreement is usually 
disclosed in the prospectus under the section “Shares Eligible for Future Sale” while 
more specific information about the nature of prohibited activities can normally be found 
in the prospectus’s “Underwriting” section. Appendix A contains excerpts from 
prospectuses demonstrating the disclosure of lockup agreements. 
 The vast majority of IPOs have a single lockup whose length is 180 days from 
the IPO issue.  For our sample, as shown in Table 2.1, 88.1% of firms have a single 
lockup while 95.8% of firms include a 180 day lockup.  96.0% of single lockup firms 
have a 180 day lockup and 94.1% of multiple lockup firms include a 180 day length for 
one of their lockups.  However, because these lockups are the result of contracting 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Sample Observations by Number of Lockups and Lockup Length 
 
 
Sample Single Lockup 
Two 
Lockups 
3 or More 
Lockups <170 days 170 - 190 days >190 days 
2000 297 265 89.2% 20 6.7% 12 4.0% 14 4.7% 271 91.2% 12 4.0% 
2001 54 48 88.9% 4 7.4% 2 3.7% 2 3.7% 49 90.7% 3 5.6% 
2002 53 48 90.6% 4 7.5% 1 1.9% 0 0.0% 50 94.3% 3 5.7% 
2003 63 57 90.5% 5 7.9% 1 1.6% 0 0.0% 57 90.5% 6 9.5% 
2004 148 128 86.5% 19 12.8% 1 0.7% 4 2.7% 133 89.9% 11 7.4% 
2005 141 104 73.8% 29 20.6% 8 5.7% 7 5.0% 116 82.3% 18 12.8% 
2006 130 106 81.5% 16 12.3% 8 6.2% 3 2.3% 112 86.2% 15 11.5% 
2007 131 123 93.9% 7 5.3% 1 0.8% 8 6.1% 115 87.8% 8 6.1% 
2008 18 18 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 18 100.0% 0 0.0% 
2009 37 33 89.2% 2 5.4% 2 5.4% 0 0.0% 33 89.2% 4 10.8% 
2010 78 76 97.4% 1 1.3% 1 1.3% 1 1.3% 73 93.6% 4 5.1% 
2011 66 62 93.9% 3 4.5% 1 1.5% 2 3.0% 62 93.9% 2 3.0% 
2012 75 70 93.3% 2 2.7% 3 4.0% 3 4.0% 70 93.3% 2 2.7% 
Total 1,291 1,138.00 88.1% 112 8.7% 41 3.2% 44 3.4% 1,159 89.8% 88 6.8% 
This table reports the number and percentage of observations yearly by number of lockups and length of lockup where, 
for multiple lockup length, overall length is determined by an average of length weighted by number of shares released at 
each lockup.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering 
price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, 
or closed end funds. 
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between issuers and underwriters and are not due to legal or regulatory requirements, 
those shareholders subject to the agreements can be released from the lockup early if 
the underwriter consents.  Brav & Gompers (2003) find that this early release occurs 
about 15% of the time. These lockups affect a substantial number of shares with a 
mean (median) of 81.8% (72.1%) of post-offer shares being subject to the lockup 
provision.  In nearly all cases, the firm’s executives and directors are subject to the 
lockup provisions. 
Additionally, the ability of the pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares is further 
restricted by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  Because the shares held 
prior to the IPO (other than those sold as secondary shares in the offering) have not 
been registered with the SEC, they are subject to the limitations of Rule 144, which 
imposes several constraints on the sale of unregistered shares.  Among these 
constraints is a one year holding period, volume limitations and disclosure to the SEC of 
sales of greater than 500 shares or $10,000 for affiliates1, and the issuing firm’s 
compliance with reporting requirements.  These reporting requirements create what is 
essentially a 90-day lockup for those pre-IPO shareholders even if they meet the 
holding requirement at the time of the IPO. 
Two primary possibilities, both rooted in information asymmetries, have been 
proposed to explain the existence of these lockups.  Brau, Lambson, and McQueen 
(2005) argue that lockups are a response to adverse selection and are used as a costly 
                                            
1 An affiliate is someone such as an executive, director, or large shareholder who is in a 
position of control with the issuing firm.  For these shareholders, they are limited to 
sales in any given three month period which do not exceed the greater of either 1% of 
the shares outstanding or the average weekly trading over the four weeks preceding the 
sale. 
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signal of the underlying firm quality with managers of good quality firms willing to take 
on longer lockups so that the true quality of their firm is more likely to be revealed prior 
to lockup expiration.  On the other hand, Brav and Gompers (2003) conclude that their 
results support the idea of the lockup as a commitment device designed to mitigate the 
moral hazard presented by the agency problem. Because the firm has taken on outside 
investment, management nolonger bears the full cost of any decisions made that are 
not value maximizing such as empire building, avoiding risky positive NPV projects or 
using perquisites.  By preventing management from selling their holdings in the firm, the 
lockup ensures that management at least shares in the costs of this sub-optimal 
behavior and is therefore less likely to exhibit such behaviors. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The bulk of the extant lockup literature falls under one of two topics: the first 
being the market reaction to lockup expiration while the second concerns the 
motivations behind differing lockup length arrangements.  Field and Hanka (2001) is 
perhaps the seminal paper regarding IPO lockup agreement expiration.  In this paper, 
the authors explore the market’s reaction to lockup expiration as well as some possible 
explanations for those reactions.  For their sample spanning 1988-1997, they find a 
significant average 5 day cumulative abnormal return of -1.9%.  Bradley et. al (2001) 
note a similar 5 day CAR of -1.61% which is persistent through the following 30 days.   
After splitting the sample into VC financed and non-VC financed firms, Field and 
Hanka (2001) find that both return and volume effects are much stronger in the VC 
sample with abnormal returns that are roughly 3 times greater in magnitude and trading 
volumes that are 5 times greater than that of the non-VC sample.  These effects are 
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consistent with their finding that venture capitalists exit the firm more aggressively than 
other insiders, which is based on a comparison of immediate post IPO holdings with 
holdings 1 year post IPO. Bradley et. al (2001) focuses primarily on this VC effect and 
note that the drop for VC firms is about 4 times greater than that of non-VC firms.  They 
also find that returns are worse for firms in high tech industries (as classified by SDC); 
however, the VC effect still persists among firms in these industries.  The authors notice 
a trend towards the standardization of the 180 day lockup and find that for the median 
firm 63.3% of post IPO shares are locked up with the 25th percentile having 51.6% 
locked up.  Consequently, over 75% of firms have the potential for a doubling in the 
number of shares available upon expiration. 
 Additionally, in decile sorts firms with the strongest post IPO performance 
experience the poorest performance upon lockup expiration while the firms with the 
worst post IPO performance are the least affected by the lockup expiration effect.  They 
find a significant increase in volume upon lockup expiration with the effect being much 
stronger in VC backed firms, which is similar to the finding by Field and Hanka that 
trading volume spikes significantly on the day following lockup expiration to a level that 
is 80% above pre-unlock volume that then falls to a level that is 40% higher where it 
remains for the remainder of their 50 day event window.  Bradley et. al notes that this 
increase in trading volume is also related to the extent of the return drop. 
Garfinkle et. al (2002) find similarly negative abnormal returns and increases in 
trading volume upon lockup expiration using a 3 year sample that includes only 180 day 
lockups. Interestingly, they note negative returns in advance of the lockup expiration, 
which would seem to indicate an anticipation of the lockup drop. 
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When exploring explanations for their findings, Field and Hanka consider several 
possibilities including a bid-ask effect induced by insiders submitting sell orders 
executed at the bid.  However, the evidence does not support this reasoning as both the 
bid and ask prices experience permanent parallel drops following expiration.  Based on 
the permanent nature of the price drop, they also rule out temporary price pressure as 
the cause of the observed negative returns.  Similarly, they rule out an increase in 
trading costs based on the parallel nature of the bid and ask price drops.  Due to the 
evidence, they conclude that the negative abnormal return is due in part to downward 
sloping demand curves; however, they find that firms whose trading volumes represent 
less than 1% of the publicly available shares also experience negative returns at unlock 
which indicates that downward sloping demand curves are not solely responsible for the 
price drop.  As a final possibility, the authors look to insider sales.  Those firms with 
insider sales around the unlock date experience worse returns than those firms without 
insider sales indicating that the lockup expiration return behavior may be due in part to 
worse than expected insider sales; however, those firms without insider sales also 
experience significantly negative returns indicating that this does not fully explain the 
phenomenon.   
 Ofek and Richardson (2000) use lockup expiration as a setting in which to 
explore downward sloping demand curves.  They document a decline in price at lockup 
expiration and explore possible explanations including bid-ask bounce, liquidity effects, 
and biased expectations of supply shocks.  They find little support for any of these 
explanations noting that liquidity increases upon expiration which is inconsistent with 
liquidity effects being the driver of the returns.  Also, the price effect seems permanent 
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and transactions are fairly evenly split between the bid and ask prices which does not 
support a bid-ask bounce effect.  They find that the price effect is consistent throughout 
time which is inconsistent with biased expectations. The authors also document that an 
increase in short interest is associated with a larger drop in price and that an increase in 
the standard deviation of earnings estimates, which they take as a demand curve 
variable, is associated with more strongly negative return reactions at lockup expiration.  
The second major strand of literature is related to the underlying reasoning 
behind lockups and more specifically the length of the lockup agreement.  Brav and 
Gompers (2003) explore the motivations behind the existence of lockup agreements.  
The authors pose three possible explanations for the existence of lockups: a signal of 
quality, a commitment mechanism, a way for underwriters to extract additional 
compensation.  Their evidence indicates that firms with VC backing, quality 
underwriters, secondary sales, and high cash flow margins have shorter lockups while 
firms with low book-to-market ratios have longer lockups.  They claim these findings 
support their commitment device hypothesis and the shorter lockup length associated 
with underwriter reputation is in opposition to the compensation extraction hypothesis.   
To test the signaling hypothesis, the authors examine price revisions, SEOs, and 
dividend initiation.  They find that firms with shorter lockups have more positive price 
revisions, have a higher probability of further offerings, and more often initiate divisions 
which they believe refute the signaling hypothesis.  Brav and Gompers conclude the 
evidence supports the commitment device hypothesis and rejects the other two 
possibilities.  
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However, Brau et. al (2005) refute the earlier criticisms of Brav & Gompers of the 
lockup as a signaling device and claim that the evidence the earlier authors found in 
support of the commitment hypothesis could also be supportive of the lockup as a 
signal.  The authors develop a formalized signaling model of the IPO lockup from which 
they generate and test several implications.  
They find that larger firms (by revenue) have shorter lockups and that SEO 
lockups tend to be shorter than IPO lockups.  Since there should be less informational 
asymmetry for already public firms, the authors argue there is less need for the lockup 
signal; as such, the SEO lockup should be shorter.   Further, investment funds and 
regulated utilities, which would be easier to value, have shorter lockups.  Firms whose 
quality has been certified by a reputable underwriter or large auditor have a shorter 
lockup length.  Additionally, higher idiosyncratic risk leads to shorter lockups as 
predicted by the model; however, this result is only significant at the 10% level.  The 
intuition here is that high idiosyncratic risk would impose a higher cost through lack of 
diversification on bad firms mimicking good firms. 
Arthurs et. al (2009) also explores the use of lockup period length as a signal of 
quality, but in their context it is a signal when other, more preferable signals such as  
VC backing or a reputable underwriter are not available. They find negative 
relationships between VC backing & underwriter reputation and lockup length,  a 
positive relationship between lockup length and the existence of a going concern issue, 
and finally find that a longer lockup period when combined with the existence of a going 
concern issue can reduce underpricing. 
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On the other hand, Yung & Zender (2010) attempt to synthesize the two 
competing potential sources for lockups, commitment device or signal, by creating a 
bifurcated sample.  One group consists of firms for which asymmetric information is the 
dominant issue attempting to be remedied by the lockup.  The other group’s use of the 
lockup is driven by the moral hazard problem.  To split the sample, they use firm size 
and underwriter reputation as proxies for asymmetric information.  
Consistent with their hypotheses, they find a positive correlation between lockup 
length and underpricing for the asymmetric information subsample but not for the moral 
hazard sample.  They also find a negative correlation between lockup length and insider 
holdings for the moral hazard sample.  For the asymmetric information sample, volatility 
(the proxy for asymmetric information) is positively correlated with lockup length but is 
not significant for the moral hazard sample. From CFO’s perspectives the lockup period 
is viewed as a relatively important mechanism to align management’s interests with 
those of shareholders. (Brau & Fawcett, 2006) 
Chen et. al (2012) attempt to attribute the motivations for insider sales in the 6 
months following lockup expiration to one of two hypotheses, portfolio diversification or 
informative selling.  In general, they find that sales by top executives have negative 
informational content in contrast to sales by other insiders which are more consistent 
with portfolio diversification.   
In most studies of IPO lockups, a number of screening criteria are used to craft 
the sample.  As such penny stocks and REITS are excluded from the analysis.  Two 
papers focus explicitly on these topics.  Bradley et. al (2006) considers the issues of 
lockup length, underpricing, initial returns, underwriter fees, and long run performance 
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of penny stocks.  They find that penny stock IPOs have longer average lockup periods, 
but 19% of penny stock IPOs have lockups of 180 days or less compared to 86% for 
ordinary IPOs.  As is typical, VC backing and underwriter reputation mitigate lockup 
length somewhat. 
Chen et. al (2011) explore the nature of lockup agreements in the context of 
REIT IPOs and find that lockup lengths tend to be longer than that of industrial IPOs 
with an average length of 325 days.  They do note a trend towards convergence 
towards the 180 day lockup with 14% prior to 1997 having a 180 day lockup whereas 
68% had a 180 day lockup over the 1997 to 2006 period.  As explanation, they offer the 
possibility of a learning curve where, during the development of the REIT structure, the 
lockup was used as a sign of commitment.  They also find that self-managed REITs 
have a longer lockup than externally managed.  Additionally, they do not find, in 
general, a significantly negative market reaction to expiration of the lockup. 
The role of Rule 144 garners attention by Anderson & Dyl (2008) who try to 
explain why NYSE eligible firms would instead choose to list on the Nasdaq.  They find 
that VC backing and post-ipo sales of restricted shares are the most likely reasons for 
an NYSE eligible firm to instead choose Nasdaq because of the way in which trading 
volume is determined for each exchange with the double counting of trades in the 
Nasdaq dealer market allowing for higher volumes from which to calculate the number 
of restricted shares that are allowed to be sold under SEC rule 144.  For the average 
Nasdaq firm, the 1% option is the binding constraint 19% of the time while it is the 
binding constraint 41% of the time for the average NYSE firm. 
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The expiration of lockup agreements is also used as a setting to explore other 
issues in finance.  Cao et. al (2004) investigates the impact of insider trading upon 
market liquidity.  They note that 23% of firms report sales by insiders within the month 
after lockup expiration with the bulk of these sales coming from executives who account 
for two-thirds of the sales.  For these firms, spreads actually decrease following lockup 
expiration. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Design 
 
2.3.1 Hypothesis Development 
Based on previous work in the area of IPO lockups, we can develop several 
hypotheses to guide our exploration of lockup determinants and subsequent market 
performance of the issuing firms.  Brav & Gompers (2003) and Brau et. al (2005) offers 
some concrete predictions about those variables, which might influence the chosen 
length of the lockup.  Following the former, we should expect young firms, more volatile 
firms, and low book-to-market firms to have longer lockups.  According to Brau et. al, we 
should expect firms suffering from greater information asymmetry and those with lower 
idiosyncratic risk to compensate by locking up shares for a longer period of time.  
Unfortunately, testing this assertion is complicated by the prevalent use of idiosyncratic 
risk as a proxy for asymmetric information (see for example, Moeller et. al (2007)).   
 Other factors may lead us to expect firms to either differ from or conform to the 
typical lockup length of 180 days.  As noted by Field and Hanka (2001), venture 
capitalists, in general, wish to distribute shares to their investors as soon as is possible.  
As a result, we would expect VC backed firms to favor shorter lockup periods.  
However, with a staged lockup, true firm insiders could be locked up for the typical 180 
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days or even longer while allowing simple finance providers such as VCs to exit quickly.  
As such, we would expect to see a higher incidence of multiple lockup use by VC 
backed firms.  Alternatively, as underwriting contracts have become more standardized 
over time, we would expect firms utilizing more reputable, powerful underwriting to 
concentrate at the more standard 180 day, single lockup arrangement.  If the lockup 
acts as a commitment device for firm executives, we could also expect a difference in 
behavior for those firm’s with multiple equity classes.  Typically these multiple classes 
are used to confer greater voting power to firm management and founders.  We could 
expect that firms with voting privileged insiders would me more likely to use multiple 
lockups so that those insiders who have already been given a privileged voting status 
would be asked to commit to maintaining that power.  
 After looking at the possible determinants of length and number of lockup 
provisions, we next turn our attention to the market impact of their release.  As Miller 
(1977) notes, the assumption of homogenous expectations might make for a compelling 
pricing model as in the capital asset pricing model, but the assumption itself is often not 
a realistic one.  He goes on to demonstrate that when expectations about the future 
performance of a stock diverge, the demand curve for the stock’s shares is downward 
sloping.  The extent of this slope is attenuated by the level of uncertainty concerning the 
stock’s true value; as such, we should expect a greater decline in share price at lockup 
expiration for those firms suffering from greater information asymmetry.  In the presence 
of downward sloping demand curves, we should also expect that those firms that 
experience greater sales by pre-IPO shareholders would have poorer event returns 
upon lockup expiration.  Accordingly, those firms with VC backing and those with the 
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greatest abnormal volume upon lockup release should perform relatively worse than 
their counterparts. 
2.3.2 Empirical Design 
 We test for election of multiple lockups using a logit regression in which the 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm employs multiple lockups and 0 
otherwise.  Because most firms with more than one lockup use only 2 lockup expiration 
dates, we treat all multiple lockup firms equally rather than treating them differentially 
and running a multinomial logistic regression.  We include a number of possible 
explanatory variables in the various regression specifications including three measures 
of information asymmetry.  The first is simply the number of analysts covering the firm.  
The other two measures, forecast error and forecast standard deviation, are based on 
the accuracy of these analysts predictions of earnings per share.  We also include firm 
age from Jay Ritter, a measure of volatility, an indicator for the presence of venture 
capital backing, the book-to-market ratio, the percent of the offering that is primary 
shares, an indicator for multiple classes of equity, offer underpricing, lead underwriter 
rank, leverage, an indicator for firms in high tech industries, the average bid ask spread, 
and three possible measures of size: total assets, offer size, and the market value of 
equity.  We include annual fixed effects and utilize robust standard errors. 
 When investigating the length of the lockup, we diverge from the extant literature 
somewhat.  Instead of using ordinary least squares as do Field and Hanka (2001) or a 
tobit regression as in Brau et. al (2005), we use a multinomial logit regression with a 
value of 0 if the lockup is short, 1 for typical length lockups, and 2 for long lockups.  To 
determine the lockup length, we calculate the average lockup length using the 
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percentage of locked up shares subject to the lockup as a weighting mechanism.  
Lockups with a weighted average length less than 170 days are classified as short; 
those lockups with a weighted average length longer than 190 days are classified as 
long, and those with a length between 170 and 190 days are classified as typical.  We 
employ this methodology because of the vast majority of lockups are at 180 days.  
Those that do differ from this that are shorter tend to cluster at 90 days, while longer 
lockups tend to cluster at 9 months and 12 months.  Our treatment allows us to test 
those effects that result in the election of a shorter or longer lockup without necessarily 
needing to draw a distinction between a 90 day average lockup and a 95 day average 
lockup, for instance.  We again include annual fixed effects and employ robust standard 
errors in our regressions. 
To determine the reaction upon lockup expiration, we employ standard event 
study methodology with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 41, 21, 11, 7, 5, and 3 
days in length centered about the lockup expiration event.  Abnormal returns are 
calculated each day as the market model residual using the CRSP value-weighted 
index as the market proxy.  Parameters for the model are determined using a 40 day 
runup period that extends from 60 days prior to the event to 21 days prior.  Additionally, 
we determine daily abnormal volume during these same event windows as the ratio of 
the day’s volume to the average volume over the 40 day pre-event runup period.   
We regress the 3 day CARs on a number of potential explanatory variables from 
the extant literature including the abnormal volume (AVOL), a venture capital indicator, 
a high tech firm indicator, a New York Stock Exchange Indicator, the stock runup prior 
to expiration, the underwriter rank, and the percent of shares subject to lockup using an 
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ordinary least squares regression.  We also include indicators for lockup length, whether 
the lockup is the second lockup, or is the third or subsequent lockup, variables 
potentially related to the lockup decision including firm age, analyst coverage, and 
volatility as well as controls for size, leverage, and asset composition.  We first perform 
this regression using all lockups then using only the largest (by number of shares locked 
up) for each firm.  Finally, we replace the CAR as the dependent variable with the 
abnormal volume, and include the 3-day CAR as an independent variable.  We run the 
same regressions as with the 3-day CARs using all lockups then the largest lockup.  For 
all of these regressions, we use annual fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
 When constructing the long-term buy and hold return (BHAR) performance 
measures for the issuing firms, we nominally follow the methodology of Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) by matching the issuing firm to a non-issuing firm to serve as a reference.  
However, we change some of the specifics of the matching process to more closely 
reflect the process currently used by Ritter to produce his more recent long run 
performance measures.  For the size matched BHARs, the market value for the non-
issuing firms is determined at the end of each month while the market value for the 
issuing firms is taken on the date of their first appearance in CRSP.  On this date, the 
issuing firm is matched to the next largest firm.  If the matched firm is delisted, the 
issuing firm is then matched to the next largest firm.  For the book-to-market matching, 
size deciles are determined based on NYSE firms at the end of each month.  Each 
issuing firm with a positive book-to-market value is then matched to the firm in its size 
decile that has the closest book-to-market value.   Again, should the matched firm be 
delisted, the match is replaced by the firm in the issuer’s size decile with the next 
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nearest book-to-market value.  For those issuers with zero or negative book-to-market 
values, the match is the non-issuing firm closest in size that also has a zero or negative 
book-to-market ratio.  In all cases, matching firms must have at least 5 years of return 
data, must not have issued equity within the past 5 years, and must have a single class 
of stock outstanding to be an eligible match. 
2.4 Data and Sample Selection 
2.4.1 Sample Construction 
To construct our primary sample, we start with the SDC Platinum New Issues 
database and pull all US IPOs with a prospectus date between January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2012.  These offerings are then subjected to an initial screening with 
non-original IPOS, unit offerings, ADRs, REITS, mutual to stock conversions, spinoffs, 
non-common stock offerings, and offerings priced below five dollars removed from the 
sample leaving us a sample with 1291 observations.  From SDC we obtain the IPO 
date, presence of venture capital (VC) backing, offering price, and offer size.   
 We next turn to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Edgar system 
to hand collect lockup expiration information from the IPO prospectuses, filing 424B.  
The required information is most often found in the prospectuses’ “Shares Eligible for 
Future Sale” section; however, the “Risk Factors” section sometimes contains additional 
information about the number of shares subject to lockup.  In the most opaque of 
prospectuses, only the categories of shareholders subject to lockup are given, and an 
estimate of the number of shares locked up must be constructed from the disclosed 
shareholder ownership numbers.  Although SDC provides information for number of 
lockups, time to lockup expiration, and number of shares released, some discrepancies 
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between the prospectuses and SDC information have been noted in the literature.  Most 
importantly for our sample, many of the observations from the year 2000 which were 
flagged as not having a lockup did indeed contain provisions for one or more lockups.  
These observations were corrected after reviewing the issuers’ prospectuses. Other 
variables were obtained from a variety of sources.  Accounting statement information 
such as the value of the firm’s assets, cash holdings, leverage, net income, and the 
book value of equity and expenses for research and development and capital 
expenditures was obtained from Compustat.  Analyst information including the number 
of analysts covering a firm, the forecast error, and the forecast standard deviation 
comes from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S.  The high tech variable is constructed based on 
firm SIC code according to Cliff and Denis (2004). Additionally several variables were 
taken from the website of Jay Ritter2 including issuer age at the time of the offering, an 
indicator for firms with multiple classes of stock, and rankings for the issuers’ lead 
underwriters.  These underwriter rankings follow the methodology of Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) but are updated to cover the later 
time period needed for our study.   
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 lists descriptive statistics.  Firms that include a single lockup 
agreement tend to be larger than those including multiple lockups with mean (median) 
total assets of $853.8 ($74.5) million versus $550.1 ($59.0) million for multiple lockup 
firms.  Additionally, their capital structure that is more heavily debt financed as indicated 
by the higher leverage and lower book value of equity than that of their multiple lockup 
                                            
2 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
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counterparts.  Multiple lockup firms tend to have greater cash holdings, use less 
reputable underwriters, and raise relatively more money in their IPO, which taken with 
the differences in capital structure, may indicate that these firms have difficulty 
accessing debt markets.  There is relatively little difference between the two firm types 
with respect to their use of venture capital, but a greater number of single lockup firms 
are high-tech firms and display greater investments in research and development along 
with lower investments in capital.  Multiple lockup firms tend to have less analyst 
coverage and, excepting median standard deviation, the analysts tend to be less 
accurate for multiple lockup firms. Firms with multiple lockups tend to be slightly 
younger, have a mean book-to-market ratio that is nearly twice that of single lockup 
firms, and experience greater underpricing.  Finally, multiple lockup firms have multiple 
share classes about twice as often as single lockup firms. 
When looking at lockup length, a few trends are noticeable.  Firm size as 
measured by total assets is larger for firms with shorter lockups than longer as are cash 
holdings and capital expenditures.  Short lockup firms also tend towards more reputable 
underwriters and have greater analyst following though there tends to be more 
dispersion in these analysts estimates.  Despite the certification provided by a well-
respected underwriter, short lockup firms experience greater underpricing relative to 
those firms with lockups of greater length. Firms with lockups around 180 days in length 
tend toward high tech industries and have the greatest amount of venture capital 
backing while those firms with long lockups tend to have much less VC backing, which 
is consistent with the idea that venture capitalists want to be able to distribute to their 
investors quickly rather than remain locked in to the issuing firm.  Firms with a 
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Table 2.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Number of Lockups         
 
Full Sample Single Lockup Firms Multiple Lockup Firms 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Total Assets 818.66364 70.746 853.7697 74.493 550.08993 59.037 
Cap. Expenditure/Sales 0.07442 0.0426 0.07348 0.04162 0.08136 0.0539 
Cash/Sales 0.24137 0.14627 0.23843 0.14011 0.26366 0.18601 
Net Income -0.62947 -1.542 -1.95023 -1.9875 9.36399 -0.295 
Sales 356.99879 59.666 355.37726 62.5555 369.26798 38.274 
Book Equity 102.93306 21.279 94.35794 21.147 168.53572 23.437 
Venture Capital Indicator 0.52595 1 0.5246 1 0.53595 1 
High Tech 0.43455 0 0.43937 0 0.39869 0 
Return on Assets -0.32313 -0.01916 -0.32186 -0.01936 -0.33275 -0.00341 
Leverage 0.25683 0.0858 0.2665 0.08926 0.18262 0.06667 
Research & 
Development/Sales 0.34993 0.18601 0.36008 0.18669 0.2743 0.17289 
Number of Analysts 3.5306 3 3.54218 3 3.44444 3 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.53305 0.18634 0.51874 0.18577 0.64908 0.18987 
Analyst Forecast Std. 
Deviation 0.19911 0.06364 0.17095 0.06531 0.44376 0.05319 
Firm Age 17.16746 9 17.36673 9 15.66216 8 
Dual Share Class Indicator 0.07049 0 0.06327 0 0.12418 0 
Lead Underwriter Rank 8.1014 9 8.1469 9 7.76316 9 
Underpricing 0.23666 0.1 0.23293 0.09743 0.2644 0.11111 
Primary Shares Sold 0.8685 1 0.87356 1 0.8309 1 
Book-to-market Ratio 0.12736 0.05831 0.11491 0.05827 0.2225 0.0608 
Offering Proceeds 156,476.60 84,000.00 142,686.47 84,000.00 259,046.32 85,500.00 
Market Value of Equity 799,785.79 396,299.17 735,096.28 405,912.00 1,280,517.66 340,441.75 
Volatility 0.04311 0.03525 0.04309 0.03526 0.04325 0.035 
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(Table 2.2 continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Lockup Length  
 
Short Lockup Firms 
Typical Length Lockup 
Firms Long Lockup Length 
 
Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  
Total Assets 934.3168 98.505 819.69546 71.693 744.05191 53.813 
Cap. Expenditure/Sales 0.07878 0.04614 0.07501 0.04322 0.06387 0.03294 
Cash/Sales 0.27575 0.19987 0.24558 0.15673 0.16439 0.06559 
Net Income 11.64739 -0.433 -1.94101 -2.073 11.51429 0.44 
Sales 208.62129 21.191 351.28569 61.561 516.00092 53.745 
Book Equity 115.19112 31.759 98.03847 21.076 165.77696 20.612 
Venture Capital Indicator 0.5 0.5 0.54875 1 0.23864 0 
High Tech 0.40909 0 0.45125 0 0.22727 0 
Return on Assets -0.19278 -0.0044 -0.32284 -0.02128 -0.39571 0.0125 
Leverage 0.13313 0.06504 0.26574 0.08757 0.19479 0.07715 
Research & 
Development/Sales 0.29839 0.28644 0.36224 0.18738 0.15668 0.05522 
Number of Analysts 3.95455 3 3.61432 3 2.21591 1.5 
Analyst Forecast Error 0.6813 0.16667 0.53281 0.18692 0.43591 0.18869 
Analyst Forecast Std. 
Deviation 0.33366 0.07547 0.19659 0.06431 0.14399 0.0449 
Firm Age 18.925 7 16.99038 9 18.75904 9 
Dual Share Class Indicator 0.11364 0 0.06212 0 0.15909 0 
Lead Underwriter Rank 8.32558 9 8.2159 9 6.49432 8 
Underpricing 0.57925 0.18018 0.22881 0.1 0.16873 0.06036 
Primary Shares Sold 0.90143 1 0.86921 1 0.84269 1 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.15487 0.05012 0.11641 0.05759 0.26778 0.08588 
Offering Proceeds 208,533.99 110,117.50 155,525.94 84,800.00 142,968.49 55,700.00 
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(Table 2.2 continued) 
Short Lockup Firms 
Typical Length Lockup 
Firms Long Lockup Length 
 
Mean   Median  Mean   Median  Mean   Median  
Market Value of Equity 2312795.743 745,901.63 761,184.67 406,525.39 551,236.50 195,593.30 
Volatility 0.04361 0.02879 0.04326 0.03539 0.0407 0.03451 
Descriptive statistics for the sample by number of lockups and by lockup length of lockup where, for multiple lockup length, 
overall length is determined by an average of length weighted by number of shares released at each lockup.  
Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than 
$5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end 
funds.   Total assets, capital expenditures, cash holdings, net income, sales, book equity, and research & development 
expense are from Compustat.  The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry defined as a 
technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts, forecast error, and standard deviation are all from 
I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has 
multiple classes of stock outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  
Underpricing is the percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s closing price.  Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the market model residual over seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup. 
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more standard lockup length are also the most highly levered, have the highest R&D 
spending, and lowest book-to-market ratio. Despite having larger overall issues, short 
lockup firms issue fewer secondary shares than firms with longer lockups, which may 
indicate a trade off between the ability to realize some sales early with forgoing the 
ability to sell shares post-IPO for a longer period of time.  Firms with multiple share 
classes tend to deviate more from the standard lockup length in both directions.  
Evidence on age and price volatility prior to lockup expiration is mixed with short lockup 
firms being the oldest (youngest) and most (least) volatile when judged by mean 
(median) values. 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Logit Regression for Multiple Lockups 
 
We begin by performing a logit regression in which the dependent variable is an 
indicator taking a value of 1 if the firm includes more than one lockup.  Table 2.3 
presents results.  For the various specifications we use three possible measure of firm 
size: total assets, the market value of equity, and offering proceeds.  Similarly we also 
use three possible proxies for information asymmetry based on I/B/E/S analyst 
coverage: forecast error, forecast standard deviation, and the number of analysts.  The 
number of analysts provides us with the greatest number of observations, as error 
requires at least one analyst to cover while forecast standard deviation requires at least 
two analysts to provide coverage.  Number of analysts is only weekly significant in 
specification (1), while forecast error is not significant in any specification.  Forecast 
standard deviation is highly significant for all cases; however, this power appears to 
result from the larger reduction in the number of applicable observations as number of
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Table 2.3: Logistic Regression for Presence of Multiple Lockups 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu 
                    
Total Assets (log) -0.211** -0.133 -0.0706 
      -0.031 (0.233) (0.570) 
      High Tech Indicator -0.356 -0.185 -0.216 -0.254 -0.106 -0.158 -0.231 -0.0953 -0.150 
(0.102) (0.451) (0.401) (0.241) (0.663) (0.532) (0.282) (0.692) (0.551) 
Venture Capital Indicator 0.235 0.252 0.422 0.327 0.354 0.520 0.351 0.366 0.519 
(0.374) (0.407) (0.215) (0.224) (0.239) (0.116) (0.190) (0.212) (0.109) 
Leverage -0.250 -0.975** -1.042* -0.383 -1.177** -1.267** -0.425 -1.170** -1.206** 
(0.538) (0.0323) (0.0514) (0.421) (0.0172) (0.0271) (0.368) (0.0142) (0.0278) 
Firm Age 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
(0.999) (0.780) (0.947) (0.619) (0.995) (0.892) (0.560) (0.958) (0.839) 
Dual Share Class Indicator 1.009*** 0.990** 1.007** 0.940** 0.870** 0.858** 0.929** 0.909** 0.944** 
(-0.009) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.038) (0.043) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) 
Average Bid Ask Spread -0.055 -0.108 -0.225 -0.052 -0.065 -0.068 -0.046 -0.051 -0.054 
(0.322) (0.894) (0.873) (0.356) (0.604) (0.679) (0.264) (0.376) (0.451) 
Lead Underwriter Rank -0.101 -0.147 0.008 -0.159** -0.211** -0.055 -0.199** -0.250** -0.093 
(0.207) (0.128) (0.949) (0.0435) (0.0307) (0.647) (0.0126) (0.0108) (0.444) 
Underpricing 0.088 0.345 0.354 0.102 0.293 0.270 -0.006 0.122 0.064 
(0.683) (0.171) (0.250) (0.627) (0.164) (0.186) (0.977) (0.598) (0.774) 
Primary Shares (%) -1.161*** -1.335*** -1.342*** -1.127*** -1.210*** -1.175*** -1.043*** -1.164*** -1.195*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.618*** 0.646*** 0.766*** 0.421** 0.532*** 0.704*** 0.441** 0.589*** 0.790*** 
(0.00725) (0.00303) (0.00485) (0.0239) (0.00483) (0.00345) (0.0179) (0.00371) (0.00247) 
Volatility 11.48** 4.915 2.320 13.99*** 7.458 4.411 14.48*** 7.654 4.368 
(0.027) (0.391) (0.696) (0.007) (0.194) (0.457) (0.006) (0.182) (0.463) 
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(Table 2.3 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu mult_lu 
Number of Analysts 0.0899* 
  
0.0700 
  
0.0432 
  (0.091) 
  
(0.208) 
  
(0.422) 
  Analyst Forecast Error 
 
0.0644 
  
0.0656 
  
0.0658 
 
 
(0.139) 
  
(0.128) 
  
(0.128) 
 Analyst Forecast Std. 
Deviation   
0.162*** 
  
0.159*** 
  
0.159*** 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Proceeds (log) 
   
-0.0520 0.102 0.214 
   
   
(0.772) (0.634) (0.294) 
   Market Value of Equity 
      
0.126 0.219 0.291* 
      
(0.396) (0.173) (0.066) 
Constant -0.761 -0.0333 -1.323 -0.682 -1.473 -3.829 -2.618 -2.905 -4.872** 
 
(0.361) (0.973) (0.304) (0.732) (0.538) (0.113) (0.152) (0.149) (0.021) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,158 1,011 944 1,158 1,011 944 1,158 1,011 944 
Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than 
$5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end 
funds.  The dependent variable is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the offering firm has multiple lockup expiration dates.  
The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry defined as a technology industry as in Cliff 
and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts, forecast error, and standard deviation are all from I/B/E/S coverage in the third 
month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock 
outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  Underpricing is the percent 
difference between the offering price and the first day’s closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of the market 
model residual over seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup. Robust p-value in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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analysts also gains significance when applied only to the firms for which standard 
deviation is available.   
The size of the offering does not appear to be a strong indicator of the number of 
lockups a firm will use.  The IPO proceeds variable is never significant, the value of 
equity is weakly significant in only one specification, and the value of the firm’s assets is 
significant in only one specification when paired with the number of analysts measure.   
 Several variables do appear to be significantly related to the choice for a firm to 
agree to multiple lockups.  The percent of the offering made in primary shares is highly 
negatively related to the decision to undertake multiple lockups.  This finding is 
consistent with the idea of firms agreeing to multiple lockups in exchange for allowing 
some of the pre-IPO holdings to be sold during the offering.  Further, firms with dual 
class structures are more likely to undertake an offer with multiple lockup dates, as this 
variable is significantly positive under all specifications.  Finally, we see a strong, 
positive relationship between book-to-market value and the presence of multiple 
lockups with the variable being significant in two specifications and highly significant in 
the remaining seven specifications.  Value firms are more likely to have multiple lockup 
dates included in their underwriting agreement. 
2.5.2 Multinomial Logit Regression for Lockup Length 
 Although we have determined those factors that relate to the election of more 
than one lockup, we do not know how those differences affect the overall length of the 
lockup agreement, or how other factors might influence the length of the lockup.  In 
Table 2.4, we perform a multinomial logit in which the dependent is an indicator that 
takes a value of 0 if the weighted average lockup length is less than 170 days, 2 if the 
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length is greater than 190 days, and 1 if the length is between 170 and 190 days, 
inclusive.  For the purposes of the regression, a value of 1 is treated as the base case. 
 In panel A, we utilize the full sample, with single and multiple lockup firms 
included.  We find that the lead underwriter rank is significantly negatively associated 
with long lockups, perhaps indicating the certification role of a reputable underwriter, 
which would offset the need for signaling provided by the longer lockup.  Further, we 
find that the presence of venture capital backing is significantly, negatively related to 
lockup length.  In this case, this finding is consistent with the desire for venture 
capitalists to be able to distribute shares to their investors more quickly, and 
consequently preferring to forgo a long lockup.  High tech firms are also less likely to 
take on long lockups. 
 In contrast, the presence of a dual class structure is positively related to lockup 
length with the variable showing significance in two specifications and weak significance 
in the third.  This result could indicate a desire for a stronger commitment from those 
pre-IPO insiders that hold disproportionate voting rights.  Interestingly, firms with a 
greater percentage of shares under lockup are more likely to deviate in both directions 
from a typical 180-day lockup.  Volatility is positively related to lockup length; however, 
as we see later, it is most likely acting as a proxy for the presence of multiple lockups. 
 In Panel B, we repeat the previous analysis but include an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the observation is for a firm with multiple lockups.  We find that the 
number of analysts is significantly negatively related to having a longer lockup, which is 
consistent with idea of this additional monitoring providing an outside measure of quality 
that lessens the need for firm insiders to indicate firm quality through lockup length.  
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Table 2.4: Multinomial Logit Regression of Lockup Length 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
              
Number of 
Analysts 
0.0944 -0.172 0.102* -0.216** 
  (0.163) (0.106) (0.083) (0.026) 
  Primary Shares 
(%) 
0.566 -1.391** 0.552 -1.170** 0.299 -0.920* 
(0.535) (0.016) (0.552) (0.033) (0.723) (0.090) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-0.243 -0.691** -0.257 -0.640** -0.203 -0.681** 
(0.517) (0.031) (0.471) (0.044) (0.572) (0.032) 
Lead Underwriter 
Rank 
-0.004 -0.237*** 0.006 -0.306*** 0.056 -0.402*** 
(0.982) (0.007) (0.970) (0.000) (0.738) (0.000) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
-0.100 -0.654** -0.116 -0.611* -0.0880 -0.658** 
(0.770) (0.050) (0.726) (0.065) (0.798) (0.045) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.232** 0.349** 0.232** 0.338** 0.272** 0.320** 
(0.043) (0.029) (0.041) (0.034) (0.049) (0.022) 
Dual Share Class 
Indicator 
0.473 1.270** 0.498 1.111** 0.575 0.944* 
(0.405) (0.024) (0.358) (0.036) (0.282) (0.060) 
Proceeds (log) 0.0500 -0.338 
    (0.860) (0.142) 
    Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
0.0308 0.161 0.033 0.178 0.008 0.172 
(0.839) (0.459) (0.828) (0.416) (0.960) (0.399) 
Volatility 1.386 17.71** 1.164 19.97** 1.348 21.12** 
(0.847) (0.023) (0.864) (0.015) (0.844) (0.012) 
Constant -4.439 2.711 -3.938** -0.789 -3.928** -0.773 
 
(0.206) (0.296) (0.015) (0.508) (0.015) (0.520) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 
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(Table 2.4 continued) 
Panel B: Full Sample With Multiple Lockup Indicator 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
 
            
Number of 
Analysts 
0.0244 -0.184** 0.0285 -0.221*** 
  (0.780) (0.037) (0.649) (0.005) 
  Primary Shares 
(%) 
1.422 -0.213 1.386 0.0542 1.311 0.273 
(0.222) (0.751) (0.237) (0.932) (0.220) (0.672) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-0.173 -0.882** -0.181 -0.820** -0.163 -0.893** 
(0.664) (0.0257) (0.629) (0.0313) (0.671) (0.0172) 
Lead Underwriter 
Rank 
-0.0415 -0.259** -0.037 -0.330*** -0.0283 -0.417*** 
(0.808) (0.033) (0.827) (0.004) (0.861) (0.000) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
-0.785* -1.570*** -0.777* -1.566*** -0.751* -1.673*** 
(0.067) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.129 0.293** 0.132 0.278** 0.215 0.172 
(0.364) (0.014) (0.350) (0.021) (0.145) (0.162) 
Dual Share Class 
Indicator 
0.231 1.164** 0.258 1.038** 0.157 0.936* 
(0.726) (0.020) (0.685) (0.032) (0.808) (0.057) 
Proceeds (log) 0.0249 -0.342 
    (0.941) (0.258) 
    Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
-0.123 -0.135 -0.126 -0.135 -0.153 -0.0596 
(0.591) (0.583) (0.567) (0.580) (0.497) (0.808) 
Volatility -7.85 8.02 -8.5 10.82 -8.282 14.52 
(0.500) (0.566) (0.463) (0.460) (0.472) (0.314) 
Multiple Lockup 
Indicator 
4.450*** 4.640*** 4.447*** 4.650*** 4.481*** 4.613*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -4.823 1.457 -4.515** -2.12 -4.555** -2.251 
 
(0.225) (0.681) (0.0130) (0.238) (0.0106) (0.214) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194 
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(Table 2.4 continued) 
Panel C: Single Lockup Firms         
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
 
            
Number of 
Analysts 
-0.158 -0.034 -0.172 -0.173 
  (0.570) (0.851) (0.551) (0.223) 
  Primary Shares 
(%) 
-0.603 1.862 -0.567 2.205 -0.350 2.596 
(0.620) (0.454) (0.636) (0.365) (0.745) (0.294) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-0.490 -1.639** -0.479 -1.642** -0.452 -1.697** 
(0.591) (0.024) (0.584) (0.028) (0.604) (0.026) 
Lead Underwriter 
Rank 
0.361 -0.332** 0.334 -0.478*** 0.218 -0.554*** 
(0.418) (0.019) (0.436) (0.000) (0.569) (0.000) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
-0.790 -2.598*** -0.756 -2.632** -0.802 -2.602** 
(0.398) (0.010) (0.412) (0.012) (0.402) (0.013) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.224 0.181 0.223 0.170 0.240* 0.186 
(0.113) (0.318) (0.114) (0.352) (0.071) (0.323) 
Dual Share Class 
Indicator 
0.428 1.530* 0.390 1.155 0.225 1.012 
(0.459) (0.080) (0.495) (0.158) (0.755) (0.209) 
Proceeds (log) -0.098 -0.703 
    (0.861) (0.101) 
    Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
-0.044 0.048 -0.043 0.030 -0.027 0.051 
(0.855) (0.850) (0.855) (0.918) (0.897) (0.846) 
Volatility -49.24* 12.39 -48.49* 14.95 -44.10* 16.03 
(0.091) (0.225) (0.089) (0.153) (0.089) (0.136) 
Constant -3.592 4.819 -4.530 -1.951 -4.484 -2.276 
(0.607) (0.306) (0.184) (0.425) (0.188) (0.362) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 
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(Table 2.4 continued) 
Panel D: Multiple Lockup Firms         
 
(10) (11) (12) 
 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
 
            
Number of 
Analysts 
0.0851 -0.384*** 0.105 -0.342** 
  (0.552) (0.008) (0.328) (0.011) 
  Primary Shares 
(%) 
4.456* 0.0815 4.349* -0.352 3.198* -0.138 
(0.064) (0.936) (0.072) (0.694) (0.056) (0.879) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
0.333 -0.0499 0.301 -0.105 0.371 -0.184 
(0.612) (0.928) (0.648) (0.847) (0.567) (0.713) 
Lead Underwriter 
Rank 
-0.187 -0.222 -0.158 -0.145 -0.120 -0.275* 
(0.448) (0.218) (0.512) (0.362) (0.582) (0.051) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
0.138 -0.879 0.131 -0.861 0.145 -1.089** 
(0.821) (0.113) (0.829) (0.123) (0.818) (0.035) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
-0.071 0.013 -0.045 0.0624 0.246 -0.065 
(0.818) (0.963) (0.885) (0.818) (0.415) (0.776) 
Dual Share Class 
Indicator 
0.900 1.694** 0.785 1.762** 0.243 1.243* 
(0.442) (0.050) (0.502) (0.043) (0.863) (0.095) 
Proceeds (log) 0.128 0.417 
    (0.759) (0.378) 
    Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
-0.183 -0.127 -0.168 -0.138 -0.203 -0.0167 
(0.553) (0.723) (0.588) (0.698) (0.521) (0.961) 
Volatility -24.19 -3.848 -25.21 -8.765 -21.54 -0.961 
(0.207) (0.838) (0.168) (0.617) (0.238) (0.959) 
Constant -2.539 -1.899 -1.223 2.714 -0.596 2.449 
(0.669) (0.746) (0.732) (0.263) (0.852) (0.292) 
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(Table 2.4 continued) 
 
(10) (11) (12) 
 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
 
            
Annual Effects 
Observations 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
139 139 139 139 139 139 
This table reports results of a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the 
average lockup length, weighted by shares released upon expiration, is less than 170 days, 1 if the length is between 170 
and 190 days, or 2 if the length is greater than 190 days.  The typical length, 170-190 days, is taken as the base case.  
Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than 
$5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end 
funds.  The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry defined as a technology industry as in 
Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts is from I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual 
class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock outstanding, and the lead underwriter 
ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  Underpricing is the percent difference between the offering price and the 
first day’s closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model residual over seventy days prior to lockup 
expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  
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Multiple lockup firms, as one would expect, are much more likely to deviate from the 
standard lockup length.  High-tech, lead underwriter rank, and the presence of VC 
backing remain strongly negatively associated with long lockups while the dual class 
structure is still positively associated with long lockups.   
 In Panel C (D), we repeat the analysis for single (multiple) lockup firms only.  
Panel C shows that the underwriter rank, high-tech, and presence of venture capital 
backing are the dominant determinants of lockup length for single lockup firms.  We also 
see a weakly negatively relationship between volatility and short lockups, perhaps 
indicating that underwriters are unwilling to let more uncertain firms bargain for a shorter 
lockup. For the multiple lockup firms of Panel D, we see the dual class variable remains 
consistent in effect with the findings in Panels A and B.  Firms in which the offering is 
more greatly composed of primary shares, are weakly more likely to use multiple 
lockups to shorten the lockup length.  We also find that the number of analysts variable 
seem to derive from the multiple lockup group; however, when the variable is excluded 
in specification 12, underwriter rank and the venture capital variable become at least 
weakly significant, which may indicate similar certification roles for analysts, 
underwriters, and VC providers.   
2.5.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Volume 
We find that the market generally reacts negatively to lockup expiration based on 
the CARs surrounding expiration dates; Table 2.5 documents these findings.  Panel A 
reports results for the first lockup for the full sample, those firms with a single lockup, 
and those with multiple lockups along with the reaction to the second lockup and third 
and subsequent lockups for the multiple lockup firms.  For the sample as a whole and 
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for single lockup firms, the reaction is highly significantly negative for all event windows 
with 3 day CARs of -1.74% and -1.81% respectively.  For multiple lockup firms, the first 
lockup expiration is received negatively regardless of window; however, the significance 
of the finding varies depending on the window.  The 21 and 41 day windows are highly 
significant while the 11 and 5 day windows are significant at the 5% level, and the 3 and 
7 day windows are only weakly significant.  Interestingly, the 3-day window is lower in 
magnitude as compared to single lockup firms while all other windows are greater in 
magnitude than their single lockup counterparts.  The second expiration for 
multiplelockup is generally negative but is only weakly significant for the 3 day window 
at -1.21%.  In contrast, for the third and subsequent expirations the reaction is generally 
positive except for the 3-day window.  
 Panel B shows that in our sample VC backed firms continue to experience poorer 
performance surrounding expiration.  The full sample and the single lockup sample 
continue to show a significantly lower event return for VC backed firms.  For those firms 
with multiple lockups, the difference isn’t, however, significant. In fact, the difference for 
all windows is smaller than for the single lockup firms.  In short, VC backing seems to 
make less of a difference for multiple lockup firms.   
 Results for high tech firms and high abnormal volume firms reported in Panels 
C&D are largely similar to those split by VC backing.  When considering either the full 
sample or single lockup firms solely, high tech firms and those with above median 
abnormal volume at expiration have significantly greater losses than non-high tech and 
low abnormal volume firms.  The differences for multiple lockup firms are generally 
insignificant with a few exceptions.  For the second lockup expiration, high abnormal  
 40 
Table 2.5: Event Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns         
 
All Firms 
Single 
Lockup 
Firms Multiple Lockup Firms 
 
Event Period 1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
1st 
Lockup 2nd Lockup 
3rd or Higher 
Lockup 
 Day -20 to 
+20 
-3.93*** -3.16*** -10.05*** -2.13 8.82 
 
 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.488) (0.135) 
 Day -10 to 
+10 
-3.49*** -3.06*** -6.91*** -0.22 7.25 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.898) (0.199) 
 Day -5 to +5 -2.55*** -2.40*** -3.77** -0.48 5.52* 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.720) (0.096) 
 Day -3 to +3 -1.67*** -1.58*** -2.35* -0.91 2.38 
 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.072) (0.404) (0.346) 
 Day -2 to +2 -1.83*** -1.83*** -1.87** -.88 0 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (.300) (.999) 
 Day -1 to +1 -1.74*** -1.81*** -1.18* -1.25* -1.21 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.088) (.633) 
 
       Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Venture Capital Backing     
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Event Period Non VC VC Backed Difference Non VC VC Backed Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-1.25 -6.33*** 5.08** -0.47 -5.60*** 5.14** 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-1.11 -5.61***  4.51*** -0.45 -5.41*** 4.96*** 
Day -5 to +5 0.42 -5.21*** 5.63*** 0.83 -5.32***  6.15*** 
 41 
(Table 2.5 continued) 
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Event Period Non VC VC Backed Difference Non VC VC Backed Difference 
Day -3 to +3 0.49 -3.60*** 4.09*** 0.76 -3.70*** 4.46*** 
Day -2 to +2 0.16 -3.61*** 3.77*** 0.26 -3.71*** 3.91*** 
Day -1 to +1 -0.01 -3.27*** 3.26*** -0.02 -3.42*** 3.40*** 
       
 
Multiple Lockup Firms Multiple Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 2nd Lockup 
Event Period Non VC VC Backed Difference Non VC VC Backed Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-7.82* -11.88*** 4.07 -1.09 -2.99 1.9 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-6.61*** -7.16* 0.55 0.17 -0.53 0.70 
Day -5 to +5 -3.01* -4.40* 1.39 0.20 -1.04 1.25 
Day -3 to +3 -1.75 -2.84 1.09 -0.97 -0.86 -0.10 
Day -2 to +2 -0.68 -2.85** 2.17 -0.04 -1.56 1.53 
Day -1 to +1 0.04 -2.18** 2.22 -1.33 -1.25 -0.15 
 
      
Panel C: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by High Tech Industry     
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Event Period 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-1.51 -7.08*** 5.59** -0.47 -6.61*** 6.14** 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-1.65* -5.86*** 4.21*** -1.14 -5.50*** 4.36*** 
Day -5 to +5 -1.24** -4.23*** 32.98*** -0.83 -4.37*** 3.53*** 
Day -3 to +3 -0.67 -2.94*** 2.27** -0.22 -3.30*** 3.08*** 
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(Table 2.5 continued) 
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Event Period 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Day -2 to +2 -0.80* -3.16*** 2.36*** -0.52 -3.49*** 2.97*** 
Day -1 to +1 -0.65* -3.14*** 2.48*** -0.51 -3.46*** 2.95*** 
       
 
Multiple Lockup Firms Multiple Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 2nd Lockup 
Event Period 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Non High 
Tech High Tech Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-9.25** -11.21** 1.96 -0.87 -3.95 3.09 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-5.49* -8.99** 3.50 0.93 -1.88 2.81 
Day -5 to +5 -4.27 -3.04 -1.24 0.49 -1.90 2.39 
Day -3 to +3 -4.04** 0.12 -4.16 0.21 -2.53 2.74 
Day -2 to +2 -2.91** -0.35 -2.57 0.37 -2.69** 3.05* 
Day -1 to +1 -1.71 -0.40 -1.31 -0.33 -2.56** 2.22 
       Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Abnormal Volatility at Lockup Expiration   
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Event Period Low AVOL High AVOL Difference Low AVOL High AVOL Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-1.64 -6.23*** 4.60** -0.39 -5.60*** 5.21** 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-2.11** -4.87*** 2.77* -1.29 -4.60*** 3.31** 
Day -5 to +5 -0.92 -4.19*** 3.28*** -0.25 -4.27*** 4.02*** 
Day -3 to +3 -0.54 -2.79*** 2.25*** -0.17 -2.81*** 2.64*** 
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(Table 2.5 Continued) 
 
All Firms Single Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 1st Lockup 
Day -2 to +2 -0.56 -3.11*** 2.54*** -0.41 -3.07*** 2.67*** 
Day -1 to +1 -0.55** -2.92*** 2.37*** -0.43 -3.01*** 2.57*** 
       
 
Multiple Lockup Firms Multiple Lockup Firms 
 
1st Lockup 2nd Lockup 
Event Period Low AVOL High AVOL Difference Low AVOL High AVOL Difference 
Day -20 to 
+20 
-7.69** -17.70** 10.01 -1.18 -3.07 1.89 
Day -10 to 
+10 
-6.05** -9.72 3.67 1.01 -1.44 2.45 
Day -5 to +5 -4.12*** -2.66 -1.46 0.08 -1.05 1.14 
Day -3 to +3 -2.34* -2.38 0.04 1.00 -2.82 3.82* 
Day -2 to +2 -1.30 -3.73 2.44 0.86 -2.61** 3.47** 
Day -1 to +1 -1.13 -1.35 0.22 1.1 -3.59*** 4.69*** 
This table reports market model abnormal returns centered about the lockup expiration date where the CRSP value 
weighted index is used as the market proxy.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive 
excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock 
conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end funds.  P-values are given in parentheses.   
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volume firms experience significantly worse performance in the 3 and 5 day windows 
and high tech firms are weakly significantly worse over the 5 day window. 
In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, we show the abnormal trading volume about lockup 
expiration.  Figure 2.1 splits the expiration events by 1st lockup, 2nd lockup, and 3rd or 
later lockup expiration where all lockups subsequent to the 2nd are grouped together into 
a single classification.  For all expirations, there is a spike in trading volume upon 
expiration followed by a decline in volume to a level that is still markedly higher than the 
pre-event volume.  The magnitude of the spike in volume is greater for earlier lockups.  
That is, the 1st lockup spike is greater than the 2nd lockup spike which is greater than the 
3rd or subsequent lockup spike; however, there is not a discernable difference in the 
post event volume between 1st and 2nd lockup whereas volume following 3rd or later 
events trend downward.  Figure 2.2 displays the volume reaction for each firm’s largest 
lockup split by VC backed and non-VC backed firms. Consistent with previous works, 
we find that VC backed firms have a much larger reaction to expiration. 
We further explore these findings in a multivariate context in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.  
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report regressions in which the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns at 
lockup expiration act as the independent variable; however, the composition of the 
samples differs between the two tables.  Table 2.6 pools all lockup expirations while 
Table 2.7 considers only the largest lockup, measured by number of shares subject to 
lockup, for each firm.  As indicated by the univariate statistics from Table 2.5, VC 
backed firms, high tech firms, and firms with high abnormal volume at lockup expiration 
all experience significantly lower returns upon lockup release in the regression setting 
as well.  These findings hold true for both samples. 
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Figure 2.1: Abnormal Trading Volume by Lockup Expiration 
 
Abnormal volume is the daily volume scaled by the 40 day average volume over days -
60 through -21 where day 0 is the expiration date for either the first, second, or third or 
higher lockup as indicated by line type.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 
2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, 
non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, 
spinoffs, or closed end funds.   
 
For the sample of all lockup releases reported in Table 2.6, price increases prior 
to lockup release, or runup, is negatively associated with lockup expiration returns 
indicating a price reversal; however, this result does not hold true when we only 
consider each firm’s largest lockup as significance is lost although the coefficient 
remains consistently negative and is only slightly smaller in magnitude.  Effectively, we 
have removed some first lockup observations for firms with more than one lockup 
period.  As such, we might expect the increase in available shares to ease any short sell 
constraints so that investors can better counteract any runup effects prior to the release 
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of later lockup agreements due to the increase in available shares from the first lockup 
release. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Abnormal Trading Volume by Venture Capital Backing 
 
Abnormal volume is the daily volume scaled by the 40 day average volume over days -
60 through -21 where day 0 is the expiration date for each firm’s largest lockup as 
measured by number of shares released.  Observations are for firms with an IPO 
between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, 
ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity 
carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end funds.   
 
Knowing that abnormal trading volume at lockup expiration is significantly related 
to abnormal returns at expiration, we next look at determinants of abnormal volume in 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9.  As before, these Tables differ by the samples under inspection with 
Table 2.8 including all lockup releases while Table 2.9 only uses the largest lockup 
expiration for each firm.  In both cases, the presence of VC backing is strongly positively 
related to higher volume supporting the notion that VCs disperse shares when they are 
able.  Additionally, firms with higher volatility prior to release tend towards significantly 
lower volume upon release.  When considering all lockups, the presence of multiple 
lockups has a strong, negative correspondence with expiration volume, but this 
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Table 2.6: Cumulative Abnormal Return Regressions for All Lockups 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
             
Abnormal 
Volume 
-0.197* -0.203* -0.196* -0.196* -0.199* -0.202* 
(0.0953) (0.0859) (0.0969) (0.0962) (0.0930) (0.0873) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
-1.899** -1.866** -1.851** -1.852** -1.870** -1.856** 
(0.0150) (0.0168) (0.0195) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.0177) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
0.374 0.353 0.391 0.391 0.402 0.395 
(0.130) (0.151) (0.121) (0.121) (0.111) (0.115) 
Primary Shares 
(%) 
-0.503 -0.641 -0.668 -0.666 -0.467 -0.522 
(0.551) (0.441) (0.423) (0.420) (0.584) (0.536) 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
0.125 0.177 0.207 0.206 0.161 0.185 
(0.744) (0.638) (0.604) (0.600) (0.677) (0.632) 
Firm Age 0.00232 0.00221 0.00116 0.00117 0.00231 0.00218 
(0.801) (0.809) (0.901) (0.900) (0.801) (0.812) 
Dual Share 
Class Indicator 
-1.303 -1.192 -1.332 -1.332 -1.421 -1.387 
(0.233) (0.271) (0.230) (0.230) (0.201) (0.211) 
Number of 
Analysts 
0.120 0.127 0.114 0.114 0.107 0.108 
(0.319) (0.296) (0.350) (0.349) (0.370) (0.367) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-1.577** -1.614** -1.595** -1.595** -1.642** -1.661** 
(0.0397) (0.0360) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0319) (0.0308) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.478 0.511 0.421 0.421 0.438 0.449 
(0.202) (0.170) (0.275) (0.275) (0.250) (0.239) 
NYSE Indicator 0.507 0.518 0.540 0.540 0.480 0.485 
(0.400) (0.388) (0.370) (0.370) (0.427) (0.421) 
Runup -1.485** -1.458** -1.489** -1.490** -1.489** -1.463** 
(0.0229) (0.0249) (0.0233) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0247) 
Underpricing -1.209 -1.192 -1.389 -1.389 -1.198 -1.189 
(0.259) (0.265) (0.204) (0.203) (0.263) (0.266) 
Proceeds (log) -0.397 -0.383 -0.346 -0.346 -0.437 -0.432 
(0.511) (0.525) (0.566) (0.564) (0.469) (0.473) 
Multiple Lockup 
Indicator 
0.714 
 
-0.0122 
 
0.549 
 (0.370) 
 
(0.988) 
 
(0.577) 
 Short Length 
Indicator   
2.483 2.474 
  
  
(0.160) (0.164) 
  Long Length 
Indicator   
0.679 0.670 
  
  
(0.509) (0.482) 
  2nd Lockup 
Indicator     
-0.314 0.139 
    
(0.793) (0.878) 
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(Table 2.6 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
3rd or Greater 
Lockup Indicator     
2.624 3.063 
    
(0.319) (0.242) 
Volatility -16.40 -14.96 -16.05 -16.06 -17.25 -16.55 
(0.621) (0.650) (0.628) (0.627) (0.604) (0.618) 
Total Assets (log) -0.389 -0.417 -0.438 -0.438 -0.399 -0.412 
(0.171) (0.135) (0.127) (0.121) (0.160) (0.145) 
Leverage 0.505 0.477 0.567 0.567 0.577 0.567 
(0.482) (0.507) (0.439) (0.439) (0.434) (0.443) 
Intangible Assets 
(%) 
1.742 1.780 1.842* 1.842* 1.742 1.765 
(0.120) (0.114) (0.0975) (0.0977) (0.120) (0.119) 
Constant 3.856 4.067 3.454 3.457 4.192 4.283 
(0.567) (0.547) (0.605) (0.604) (0.533) (0.526) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 
R-squared 0.043 0.042 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044 
This table reports regression results for all lockup expirations.  The dependent variable 
is the three-day cumulative abnormal return using the CRSP value weighted index as 
the market proxy.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 
inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock 
offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end 
funds.  The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry 
defined as a technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts is 
from I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual class 
indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock outstanding, 
and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  Underpricing 
is the percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s closing price.  
Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model residual over seventy days prior 
to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  Runup is the cumulative 
return from IPO until day -20.  Abnormal volume is the ratio of the day’s volume to the 
average volume over the 40-day pre-event runup period accumulated over the three-
day event window.  P-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.7: Cumulative Abnormal Return Regressions for Each Firm’s Largest Lockup 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
              
Abnormal Volume -0.227* -0.230* -0.226* -0.226* -0.229* -0.229* 
(0.0715) (0.0685) (0.0721) (0.0725) (0.0692) (0.0691) 
Venture Capital 
Indicator 
-1.712** -1.687** -1.670* -1.682** -1.621* -1.621* 
(0.0411) (0.0443) (0.0507) (0.0476) (0.0569) (0.0567) 
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(Table 2.7 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
0.288 0.275 0.308 0.307 0.302 0.302 
(0.312) (0.336) (0.286) (0.286) (0.294) (0.293) 
Primary Shares 
(%) 
-0.291 -0.401 -0.519 -0.497 -0.502 -0.502 
(0.742) (0.646) (0.553) (0.568) (0.567) (0.567) 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
0.239 0.294 0.363 0.352 0.358 0.357 
(0.605) (0.519) (0.457) (0.464) (0.462) (0.458) 
Firm Age 0.000627 0.000270 0.000289 0.000380 0.00159 0.00159 
(0.949) (0.978) (0.977) (0.969) (0.872) (0.872) 
Dual Share 
Class Indicator 
-1.474 -1.387 -1.462 -1.468 -1.573 -1.573 
(0.221) (0.242) (0.233) (0.229) (0.198) (0.197) 
Number of 
Analysts 
0.173 0.176 0.158 0.157 0.160 0.160 
(0.217) (0.214) (0.267) (0.269) (0.240) (0.238) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-1.603* -1.638** -1.613* -1.610* -1.667** -1.666** 
(0.0537) (0.0478) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0447) (0.0446) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.530 0.559 0.471 0.470 0.489 0.489 
(0.233) (0.207) (0.299) (0.299) (0.280) (0.277) 
NYSE Indicator 0.273 0.281 0.333 0.334 0.274 0.274 
(0.674) (0.664) (0.609) (0.608) (0.672) (0.672) 
Runup -1.246 -1.252 -1.261 -1.262 -1.232 -1.232 
(0.120) (0.120) (0.117) (0.116) (0.124) (0.123) 
Underpricing -1.165 -1.160 -1.354 -1.348 -1.154 -1.154 
(0.314) (0.316) (0.249) (0.251) (0.318) (0.318) 
Proceeds (log) 0.00181 0.0102 0.0476 0.0424 -0.0665 -0.0665 
(0.998) (0.987) (0.938) (0.945) (0.913) (0.913) 
Multiple Lockup 
Indicator 
0.803 
 
-0.197 
 
-0.0074 
 (0.466) 
 
(0.852) 
 
(0.996) 
 Short Length 
Indicator   
4.777* 4.646* 
  
  
(0.0597) (0.0748) 
  Long Length 
Indicator   
0.415 0.287 
  
  
(0.743) (0.804) 
  2nd Lockup 
Indicator     
-0.0163 -0.0233 
    
(0.993) (0.983) 
3rd or Greater 
Lockup Indicator     
4.978 4.971 
    
(0.250) (0.232) 
Volatility -21.28 -20.66 -20.28 -20.34 -22.47 -22.47 
(0.550) (0.560) (0.568) (0.567) (0.529) (0.529) 
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(Table 2.7 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-0.402 -0.423 -0.478 -0.474 -0.419 -0.419 
(0.208) (0.179) (0.138) (0.136) (0.189) (0.188) 
Leverage 0.597 0.592 0.692 0.689 0.715 0.715 
(0.448) (0.452) (0.395) (0.397) (0.385) (0.385) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
1.348 1.368 1.495 1.495 1.356 1.356 
(0.231) (0.224) (0.185) (0.184) (0.230) (0.232) 
Constant -0.0749 0.0993 -0.326 -0.295 0.873 0.872 
(0.991) (0.988) (0.962) (0.966) (0.899) (0.899) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 
R-squared 0.044 0.043 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.047 
This table reports regression results for each firm’s largest lockup measured by number 
of shares subject to lockup.  The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return using the CRSP value weighted index as the market proxy.  
Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding 
firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, 
mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end funds.  The 
variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry defined as a 
technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts is from I/B/E/S 
coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual class indicator, which has 
a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock outstanding, and the lead 
underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  Underpricing is the 
percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s closing price.  Volatility 
is the standard deviation of the market model residual over seventy days prior to lockup 
expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  Runup is the cumulative return from 
IPO until day -20. Abnormal volume is the ratio of the day’s volume to the average 
volume over the 40-day pre-event runup period accumulated over the three-day event 
window. P-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
lower volume upon release.  When considering all lockups, the presence of multiple 
lockups has a strong, negative correspondence with expiration volume, but this effect 
loses significance when only the largest lockup is included in the sample.  Lastly, for the 
sample containing only the largest lockups, underwriter rank is strongly, positively 
associated with increased volume. 
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Table 2.8: Abnormal Volume Regressions for All Lockups 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Abnormal Volume 
              
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
-0.0255 -0.0264 -0.0254 -0.0255 -0.0263 -0.0256 
(0.116) (0.104) (0.118) (0.117) (0.106) (0.116) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
1.162*** 1.132*** 1.190*** 1.128*** 1.143*** 1.191*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
0.122 0.146 0.135 0.135 0.141 0.140 
(0.287) (0.208) (0.227) (0.228) (0.233) (0.221) 
Primary 
Shares (%) 
-0.142 0.00818 -0.107 0.0209 -0.0321 -0.0999 
(0.607) (0.977) (0.700) (0.941) (0.910) (0.719) 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
-0.136 -0.194** -0.153 -0.205** -0.175* -0.148 
(0.175) (0.0422) (0.140) (0.0363) (0.0687) (0.159) 
Firm Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004* 
(0.105) (0.111) (0.0948) (0.148) (0.117) (0.0905) 
Dual Share 
Class Indicator 
0.194 0.0727 0.142 0.112 0.105 0.119 
(0.480) (0.793) (0.611) (0.692) (0.708) (0.669) 
Number of 
Analysts 
-0.0690 -0.0771 -0.0632 -0.0726 -0.0741 -0.0666 
(0.170) (0.125) (0.209) (0.149) (0.142) (0.188) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
0.0349 0.0742 0.0416 0.0704 0.0592 0.0309 
(0.891) (0.772) (0.871) (0.783) (0.818) (0.903) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.171* 0.136 0.169* 0.163* 0.144 0.163* 
(0.0550) (0.120) (0.0582) (0.0683) (0.105) (0.0683) 
NYSE Indicator 0.177 0.166 0.160 0.157 0.166 0.157 
(0.371) (0.404) (0.413) (0.423) (0.404) (0.423) 
Runup 0.0457 0.0149 0.0630 0.0271 0.00897 0.0763 
(0.815) (0.940) (0.747) (0.891) (0.964) (0.696) 
Underpricing -0.0277 -0.0470 -0.0218 0.0158 -0.0425 -0.0161 
(0.924) (0.870) (0.941) (0.956) (0.883) (0.956) 
Proceeds (log) -0.171 -0.188 -0.159 -0.198 -0.187 -0.165 
(0.436) (0.392) (0.471) (0.366) (0.396) (0.456) 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
-0.782*** 
 
-
0.911*** 
  
-
1.161*** 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
Short Length 
Indicator   
-0.118 -0.785*** 
 
-0.155 
  
(0.665) (0.00185) 
 
(0.553) 
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(Table 2.8 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Abnormal Volume 
Long Length 
Indicator   
0.456* -0.176 
 
0.440 
  
(0.0975) (0.489) 
 
(0.112) 
2nd Lockup 
Indicator     
-0.471** 0.412 
    
(0.0225) (0.254) 
3rd or Greater 
Lockup 
Indicator 
    
-0.110 0.687 
    
(0.712) (0.124) 
Volatility 
-29.03*** 
-
30.81*** 
-
29.40*** -30.44*** 
-
30.51*** 
-
29.36*** 
(.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-0.149 -0.119 -0.147 -0.111 -0.128 -0.148 
(0.107) (0.193) (0.115) (0.224) (0.162) (0.112) 
Leverage -0.394*** -0.366** -0.391** -0.393*** -0.367** -0.383** 
(0.00883) (0.0141) (0.0102) (0.00997) (0.0151) (0.0113) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-0.0388 -0.0798 -0.0825 -0.104 -0.0743 -0.0765 
(0.902) (0.798) (0.796) (0.742) (0.812) (0.811) 
Constant 5.198** 5.002* 4.921* 5.157** 5.097* 4.963* 
(0.0469) (0.0561) (0.0568) (0.0455) (0.0528) (0.0560) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251 
R-squared 0.084 0.079 0.085 0.080 0.080 0.086 
This table reports regression results for all lockup expirations.  The dependent variable 
is the three-day abnormal volume where abnormal volume is the ratio of the day’s 
volume to the average volume over the 40-day pre-event runup period. Observations 
are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose 
offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to 
stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end funds.  The variable high 
tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is an industry defined as a technology 
industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of analysts is from I/B/E/S coverage in 
the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual class indicator, which has a value of 1 
if the firm has multiple classes of stock outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking 
were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  Underpricing is the percent difference between 
the offering price and the first day’s closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the market model residual over seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 
days prior to lockup.  Runup is the cumulative return from IPO until day -20.  Cumulative 
abnormal return is the three-day cumulative abnormal return using the CRSP value 
weighted index as the market proxy.  P-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 2.9: Abnormal Volume Regressions for Each Firm’s Largest Lockup 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Abnormal Volume 
              
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
-
0.029*** 
-
0.030*** 
-
0.029*** 
-
0.029*** 
-
0.030*** 
-
0.030*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
1.077*** 1.064*** 1.080*** 1.051*** 1.078*** 1.089*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
0.266*** 0.274*** 0.267*** 0.264*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Primary 
Shares (%) 
-0.145 -0.0794 -0.146 -0.0904 -0.128 -0.163 
(0.787) (0.882) (0.786) (0.866) (0.812) (0.763) 
Book-to-Market 
Ratio 
-0.279 -0.312 -0.278 -0.305 -0.295 -0.260 
(0.363) (0.307) (0.366) (0.319) (0.336) (0.400) 
Firm Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.405) (0.425) (0.405) (0.426) (0.413) (0.423) 
Dual Share 
Class Indicator 
0.282 0.231 0.280 0.265 0.267 0.247 
(0.578) (0.648) (0.582) (0.603) (0.599) (0.629) 
Number of 
Analysts 
-0.102* -0.104* -0.101* -0.105* -0.102* -0.104* 
(0.0898) (0.0833) (0.0919) (0.0820) (0.0896) (0.0854) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
0.0862 0.107 0.0869 0.0948 0.0935 0.0800 
(0.746) (0.689) (0.745) (0.723) (0.726) (0.765) 
Shares Locked 
Up (%) 
0.0974 0.0808 0.0965 0.0929 0.0832 0.0957 
(0.574) (0.640) (0.579) (0.593) (0.631) (0.583) 
NYSE Indicator 0.0519 0.0472 0.0516 0.0521 0.0532 0.0460 
(0.883) (0.893) (0.884) (0.883) (0.880) (0.896) 
Runup 0.155 0.159 0.156 0.154 0.159 0.157 
(0.524) (0.515) (0.523) (0.528) (0.515) (0.521) 
Underpricing 0.0364 0.0333 0.0342 0.0505 0.0368 0.0335 
(0.894) (0.903) (0.902) (0.855) (0.893) (0.904) 
Proceeds (log) -0.129 -0.134 -0.128 -0.141 -0.136 -0.134 
(0.571) (0.555) (0.575) (0.536) (0.550) (0.560) 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
-0.474 
 
-0.494 
  
-0.899 
(0.210) 
 
(0.291) 
  
(0.275) 
Short Length 
Indicator   
0.0404 -0.287 
 
0.0137 
  
(0.958) (0.684) 
 
(0.986) 
Long Length 
Indicator   
0.0362 -0.284 
 
0.0922 
  
(0.951) (0.573) 
 
(0.879) 
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(Table 2.9 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Abnormal Volume 
2nd Lockup 
Indicator     
-0.404 0.428 
    
(0.394) (0.616) 
3rd or Greater 
Lockup 
Indicator 
    
0.00310 0.835 
    
(0.997) (0.458) 
Volatility -
30.29*** 
-
30.72*** 
-
30.30*** 
-
30.49*** 
-
30.65*** 
-
30.38*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-0.158 -0.146 -0.159 -0.147 -0.154 -0.159 
(0.168) (0.202) (0.170) (0.202) (0.180) (0.169) 
Leverage -0.397 -0.395 -0.395 -0.406 -0.387 -0.384 
(0.167) (0.169) (0.170) (0.159) (0.179) (0.184) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-0.0979 -0.109 -0.0987 -0.0982 -0.117 -0.0872 
(0.867) (0.852) (0.867) (0.867) (0.842) (0.882) 
Constant 3.903 3.806 3.886 3.970 3.928 3.941 
(0.112) (0.122) (0.117) (0.109) (0.111) (0.113) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110 
R-squared 0.095 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.094 0.095 
This table reports regression results for each firm’s largest lockup measured by number 
of shares subject to lockup. The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal volume 
where abnormal volume is the ratio of the day’s volume to the average volume over the 
40-day pre-event runup period. Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 
and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-
common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, 
or closed end funds.  The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is 
an industry defined as a technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of 
analysts is from I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual 
class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock 
outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  
Underpricing is the percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s 
closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model residual over 
seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  Runup is 
the cumulative return from IPO until day -20.  Cumulative abnormal return is the three-
day cumulative abnormal return using the CRSP value weighted index as the market 
proxy.  P-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.4 Long Run Returns 
Table 2.10 reports long run returns for the sample firms with market and style 
adjustments.  The market-adjusted returns are constructed using the CRSP value 
weighted index as the market proxy.  Style adjusted returns use a firm matched by size 
or by size and book-to-market value as the adjustment reference.  For the sample as a 
whole, issuing firms consistently underperform their reference for the 3 years after 
issue. The degree of underperformance is worst when measured against size matched 
firms whereas market and book-to-market adjusted returns are similar for the first year 
with book-to-market adjusted returns in years 2 and 3 being worse than the market 
adjusted. When comparing firms with single lockups versus those with multiple lockups, 
no readily discernable pattern is apparent.  By the market-adjusted measure, single 
lockup firms outperform those with multiple lockups; however, multiple lockup firms are 
the better performers using size-adjusted returns.  Results are mixed according to the 
book-to-market measure.  When lockup length is considered, those firms with short 
lockups underperform the typical lockup length firms when measured by market 
adjusted returns, but are generally better at yearly intervals when using style adjusted 
returns.  Again, results are mixed by the book-to-market measure. Long lockup firms are 
generally poorer performers as compared to typical length firms with the exception of 
the second six months following issue and three-year returns as measured by book-to-
market matched returns and two-year returns measured against size matched firms. 
In Tables 2.11 and 2.12, we run regressions with long run returns as the 
dependent variable.  In Table 2.12, we have excluded offerings from the year 2000 as 
Ritter and Welch (2002) note that the significance of underpricing on long run 
 56 
Table 2.10: Buy and Hold Long Run Returns by Number of Lockups and Lockup Length 
 
Panel A: Full Sample           
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -7.625 -5.625 -8.439 -7.976 -6.043 
Size Adjusted -11.480 -9.299 -16.863 -21.692 -18.931 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -7.357 -6.065 -8.771 -11.771 -14.709 
      Panel B: Single Lockup           
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -8.195 -5.478 -8.882 -8.070 -4.900 
Size Adjusted -12.270 -10.148 -18.944 -23.552 -19.706 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -7.178 -6.317 -9.041 -11.465 -15.276 
      Panel C: Multiple 
Lockup           
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -6.545 -9.427 -9.827 -13.381 -18.631 
Size Adjusted -9.943 -5.856 -7.772 -13.704 -16.585 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -8.694 -4.187 -6.753 -13.941 -10.687 
      Panel D: Short Lockups           
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -10.597 -17.358 -11.314 -17.827 -10.984 
Size Adjusted -7.966 -22.906 -13.561 -27.838 -22.244 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -8.506 -9.354 -4.342 -15.396 -14.203 
      Panel E: Typical Lockups         
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -7.547 -4.969 -8.018 -8.329 -5.945 
Size Adjusted -11.833 -9.188 -17.735 -23.253 -18.827 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -6.263 -6.132 -8.121 -11.221 -15.338 
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(Table 2.10 continued) 
Panel F: Long Lockups           
 
1st 6 
Months 
2nd 6 
Months 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
Market Adjusted -12.659 -13.126 -20.688 -9.587 -13.433 
Size Adjusted -16.079 -9.084 -18.088 -7.084 -24.833 
Book-to-market 
Adjusted -21.178 -3.561 -19.508 -17.476 -6.297 
This table reports market and style adjusted long run returns for periods up to 3 years 
following IPO. Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 and 2012 inclusive 
excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-common stock offerings, 
REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, or closed end funds.  
The CRSP value weighted index is used for the market adjustment. For size matched 
BHARs, the market value for the non-issuing firms is determined at the end of each 
month while the market value for the issuing firms is taken on the date of their first 
appearance in CRSP.  On this date, the issuing firm is matched to the next largest firm.  
If the matched firm is delisted, the issuing firm is then matched to the next largest firm.  
For book-to-market matching, size deciles are determined based on NYSE firms at the 
end of each month.  Each issuing firm with a positive book-to-market value is then 
matched to the firm in its size decile that has the closest book-to-market value.   Again, 
should the matched firm be delisted, the match is replaced by the firm in the issuer’s 
size decile with the next nearest book-to-market value.  For those issuers with zero or 
negative book-to-market values, the match is the non-issuing firm closest in size that 
also has a zero or negative book-to-market ratio.  In all cases, matching firms must 
have at least 5 years of return data, must not have issued equity within the past 5 years, 
and must have a single class of stock outstanding to be an eligible match.  
 
performance determinant is limited to the dot-com era.  Regardless of the form of the 
long run return, several variables maintain significant explanatory power.  Firms 
choosing to utilize multiple lockups have significantly lower 3 year buy and hold returns.  
Firms offering more primary shares have poorer performance over all time horizons, 
perhaps owing to insider sales subsequent to the offering, while those firms with higher 
volatility prior to lockup expiration significantly underperform over all time periods 
excluding the second 6 months following the public offering.  When year 2000 IPOs are 
included, underpricing is strongly negatively related to long run performance; however, 
when excluded, this effect is greatly mitigated for all horizons except the three-year.  
Analyst coverage is positively related to performance in the first six months, but is  
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Table 2.11: Buy and Hold Long Run Regressions 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
3.255 5.417 6.326 -10.09 -22.66** 
(0.554) (0.260) (0.357) (0.294) (0.048) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-6.512 5.561* -0.729 -2.230 1.845 
(0.122) (0.0862) (0.898) (0.776) (0.846) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
3.941*** 1.213 3.779** 3.345 0.981 
(0.000) (0.241) (0.010) (0.110) (0.735) 
Primary 
Shares (%) -16.60*** -18.73*** 
-
36.21*** 
-
49.67*** 
-
58.65*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
6.680** 0.606 2.694 4.457 0.536 
(0.0282) (0.841) (0.463) (0.362) (0.955) 
Volatility 
-592.9*** -219.4** 
-
613.7*** 
-
640.6*** -517.6** 
(0) (0.0112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0190) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.964 2.056* 1.617 3.246 8.788** 
(0.185) (0.0747) (0.470) (0.280) (0.040) 
Leverage 9.696** -4.548* 1.221 -0.0788 -2.740 
(0.0144) (0.0572) (0.773) (0.987) (0.658) 
Firm Age 0.0321 -0.0192 -0.0105 0.158 0.0180 
(0.525) (0.679) (0.896) (0.207) (0.915) 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-7.141 -9.038* -14.38* -7.053 -38.14* 
(0.116) (0.073) (0.069) (0.538) (0.092) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.617** -1.134* 0.178 1.176 1.813 
(0.0142) (0.0586) (0.851) (0.441) (0.420) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.02* -5.242 -14.16 -7.144 -22.13 
(0.0627) (0.401) (0.104) (0.588) (0.227) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-7.617*** -1.909 -9.038** -14.19** -11.24 
(0.00478) (0.412) (0.0180) (0.0122) (0.170) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-3.819 -0.210 -2.070 -3.891 -7.353 
(0.207) (0.943) (0.592) (0.482) (0.302) 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
3.234* 3.015* 6.941* 15.22** 31.36** 
(0.080) (0.099) (0.066) (0.013) (0.048) 
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(Table 2.11 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.031 3.902 6.126 2.935 5.130 
(0.763) (0.268) (0.249) (0.709) (0.646) 
Underpricing 
-8.657*** -9.199*** 
-
11.65*** 
-
10.06*** 
-
19.77*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-2.881 -12.81 -7.919 -16.25 -3.299 
(0.704) (0.111) (0.465) (0.228) (0.871) 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-7.646 -9.624* -15.06* 2.742 3.494 
(0.183) (0.0975) (0.0711) (0.843) (0.836) 
Constant 89.38*** 6.416 94.08** 149.8** 119.1 
 
(0.00293) (0.802) (0.0279) (0.0168) (0.183) 
Annual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,092 958 799 
R-squared 0.236 0.217 0.271 0.295 0.254 
Panel B: Size Adjusted         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 2nd 6 months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
3.359 5.991 7.097 -9.467 -21.95** 
(0.542) (0.212) (0.302) (0.325) (0.047) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-6.246 5.827* -0.0901 -1.503 3.541 
(0.139) (0.072) (0.987) (0.848) (0.696) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
3.907*** 1.027 3.516** 3.122 1.094 
(0.000240) (0.319) (0.0164) (0.140) (0.701) 
Primary 
Shares (%) 
-16.53*** -18.60*** -35.98*** -49.71*** -57.82*** 
(0.00192) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
7.098** 1.103 3.932 5.993 7.494 
(0.0197) (0.709) (0.255) (0.223) (0.320) 
Volatility -586.3*** -213.4** -596.0*** -619.6*** -406.5** 
(0.000) (0.0135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0451) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.913 2.244* 1.864 3.480 9.020** 
(0.196) (0.0517) (0.406) (0.249) (0.024) 
Leverage 10.18*** -4.111* 2.153 0.944 0.385 
(0.00974) (0.0863) (0.605) (0.847) (0.946) 
Firm Age 0.0309 -0.0234 -0.0158 0.156 -0.0107 
(0.543) (0.613) (0.845) (0.217) (0.947) 
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 (Table 2.11 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-5.994 -7.616 -11.03 -3.021 -16.52 
(0.183) (0.121) (0.130) (0.784) (0.312) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.662** -1.093* 0.284 1.309 2.687 
(0.0119) (0.0691) (0.765) (0.395) (0.223) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.35* -5.803 -15.10* -8.263 -21.56 
(0.055) (0.351) (0.082) (0.531) (0.223) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-7.626*** -1.978 -9.014** -14.14** -11.59 
(0.005) (0.396) (0.018) (0.013) (0.128) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-3.594 0.0863 -1.444 -3.150 -4.580 
(0.234) (0.977) (0.706) (0.566) (0.496) 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
2.238 1.621 3.862 11.56* 12.83 
(0.208) (0.331) (0.184) (0.0519) (0.232) 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.133 4.035 6.456 3.272 6.210 
(0.740) (0.252) (0.225) (0.679) (0.570) 
Underpricing 
-8.619*** -9.065*** 
-
11.42*** 
-
9.668*** 
-
18.69*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-2.246 -10.58 -4.667 -13.25 3.527 
(0.771) (0.183) (0.666) (0.331) (0.861) 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-7.492 -9.747* -14.83* 3.480 5.564 
(0.191) (0.0931) (0.0737) (0.801) (0.725) 
Constant 88.75*** 7.286 93.18** 148.0** 115.1 
 
(0.00322) (0.775) (0.0289) (0.0179) (0.166) 
Annual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,089 1,089 1,089 955 797 
R-squared 0.237 0.219 0.274 0.294 0.256 
Panel C: Size and Book to Market Adjusted     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
3.547 6.382 7.126 -8.805 -22.82* 
(0.535) (0.196) (0.316) (0.377) (0.0510) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-7.036 5.951* -0.830 -2.321 1.966 
(0.101) (0.0672) (0.887) (0.774) (0.837) 
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(Table 2.11 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
3.926*** 1.086 3.637** 3.427 1.315 
(0.000247) (0.294) (0.0139) (0.106) (0.651) 
Primary 
Shares (%) -16.30*** -19.58*** 
-
36.65*** 
-
50.54*** 
-
67.10*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
6.586** 0.566 2.607 4.030 -0.532 
(0.0311) (0.852) (0.479) (0.504) (0.965) 
Volatility 
-595.5*** -206.8** 
-
607.4*** 
-
656.8*** -558.3** 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.850 2.143* 1.817 3.365 8.515* 
(0.221) (0.0666) (0.433) (0.294) (0.061) 
Leverage 9.882** -4.315* 1.500 0.553 0.562 
(0.0132) (0.0746) (0.727) (0.919) (0.935) 
Firm Age 0.0260 -0.0222 -0.0209 0.147 0.0224 
(0.609) (0.632) (0.797) (0.252) (0.898) 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-7.509 -8.836* -14.55* -7.401 -42.11* 
(0.101) (0.0802) (0.0672) (0.530) (0.0688) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.656** -1.089* 0.201 1.379 1.735 
(0.0134) (0.0713) (0.833) (0.382) (0.462) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.03* -4.343 -13.87 -5.735 -21.01 
(0.0650) (0.489) (0.115) (0.668) (0.257) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-7.898*** -2.380 -9.630** -15.13** -10.88 
(0.00444) (0.318) (0.0153) (0.0123) (0.232) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-3.241 0.105 -1.499 -4.129 -8.530 
(0.288) (0.972) (0.702) (0.460) (0.239) 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
3.232* 3.026* 6.896* 15.23** 33.28** 
(0.0817) (0.0998) (0.0685) (0.0139) (0.0438) 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.128 4.579 6.662 4.063 3.554 
(0.744) (0.196) (0.215) (0.612) (0.756) 
Underpricing 
-8.119*** -9.942*** 
-
11.77*** -9.943** 
-
19.45*** 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-2.990 -10.96 -5.722 -15.18 -4.920 
(0.702) (0.171) (0.599) (0.270) (0.811) 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-7.838 -11.54** -16.25* 1.834 3.027 
(0.187) (0.0461) (0.0586) (0.898) (0.861) 
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(Table 2.11 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 2nd 6 months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Constant 91.69*** 11.74 100.7** 160.6** 123.6 
 
(0.003) (0.652) (0.0230) (0.0149) (0.204) 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 937 776 
R-squared 0.235 0.218 0.268 0.293 0.252 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the buy and hold 
long run returns for IPO firms.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2000 
and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-
common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, 
or closed end funds.  The CRSP value weighted index is used for the market 
adjustment. For size matched BHARs, the market value for the non-issuing firms is 
determined at the end of each month while the market value for the issuing firms is 
taken on the date of their first appearance in CRSP.  On this date, the issuing firm is 
matched to the next largest firm.  If the matched firm is delisted, the issuing firm is then 
matched to the next largest firm.  For book-to-market matching, size deciles are 
determined based on NYSE firms at the end of each month.  Each issuing firm with a 
positive book-to-market value is then matched to the firm in its size decile, which has 
the closest book-to-market value.   Again, should the matched firm be delisted, the 
match is replaced by the firm in the issuer’s size decile with the next nearest book-to-
market value.  For those issuers with zero or negative book-to-market values, the match 
is the non-issuing firm closest in size that also has a zero or negative book-to-market 
ratio.  In all cases, matching firms must have at least 5 years of return data, must not 
have issued equity within the past 5 years, and must have a single class of stock 
outstanding to be an eligible match. The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 
if the firm is an industry defined as a technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  
Number of analysts is from I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, 
the dual class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock 
outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  
Underpricing is the percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s 
closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model residual over 
seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  Runup is 
the cumulative return from IPO until day -20.  Robust p-value in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
negatively related in the following 6 months such that the effect is lost going forward.  
Leverage behaves similarly with more highly levered firms initially performing well, but 
again this effect is largely reversed in the second six months.  The percent of shares 
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locked up consistently has a positive effect on long-term performance, but this effect is 
generally only significant during the first six months and over the two year time period.   
Table 2.12: Buy and Hold Long Run Regressions, Excluding Year 2000 
Panel A: Market Adjusted         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
-1.577 6.481 3.596 -13.10 -27.09** 
(0.733) (0.234) (0.634) (0.239) (0.0301) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-3.277 6.242* 1.874 2.384 8.967 
(0.414) (0.0989) (0.792) (0.809) (0.452) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
1.961* 0.946 2.750 2.788 
-
0.00762 
(0.0738) (0.415) (0.118) (0.271) (0.998) 
Primary 
Shares (%) -19.57*** -17.10*** 
-
37.24*** 
-
52.08*** 
-
58.85*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
7.746*** 1.407 4.874 5.692 6.342 
(0.00793) (0.654) (0.163) (0.274) (0.430) 
Volatility 
-512.7*** -107.8 
-
580.3*** 
-
711.8*** -815.9** 
(0.000) (0.435) (0.004) (0.010) (0.0236) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.953 2.425* 1.038 3.386 8.742 
(0.218) (0.0705) (0.726) (0.393) (0.111) 
Leverage 9.911** -4.901** 1.630 0.782 -2.627 
(0.0124) (0.0395) (0.719) (0.885) (0.698) 
Firm Age 
0.0363 -0.0334 
-
0.00551 0.148 
-
0.00826 
(0.443) (0.483) (0.947) (0.250) (0.963) 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-9.248* -7.988 -13.77 -5.274 -17.63 
(0.0574) (0.135) (0.101) (0.687) (0.357) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.102 -1.307** -0.117 0.587 2.422 
(0.102) (0.0453) (0.914) (0.740) (0.376) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.69** -5.525 -18.50** -10.94 -21.86 
(0.0371) (0.403) (0.0398) (0.437) (0.286) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-5.061* -0.0545 -5.759 -12.14* -8.507 
(0.0708) (0.983) (0.227) (0.0797) (0.405) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-2.237 0.245 -1.135 -0.830 -2.494 
(0.497) (0.943) (0.818) (0.908) (0.781) 
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(Table 2.12 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
6 
months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
3.510* 0.834 4.526 13.97** 14.82 
(0.0674) (0.652) (0.177) (0.0359) (0.210) 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.340 2.861 5.345 1.925 3.804 
(0.694) (0.441) (0.350) (0.821) (0.754) 
Underpricing -8.016 -1.016 -10.67 -13.70 -28.13** 
(0.101) (0.853) (0.205) (0.218) (0.0217) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-0.559 -12.66 -8.057 -21.15 -3.802 
(0.939) (0.175) (0.529) (0.221) (0.892) 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-7.968 -10.50 -13.76 7.586 11.21 
(0.155) (0.104) (0.153) (0.638) (0.555) 
Constant 56.60* 10.23 67.04 174.7** 149.8 
 
(0.0649) (0.747) (0.204) (0.0228) (0.188) 
Annual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 858 858 858 755 624 
R-squared 0.134 0.103 0.124 0.192 0.169 
Panel B: Size Adjusted         
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
6 
months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
-1.529 7.191 4.383 -12.63 -27.06** 
(0.741) (0.185) (0.561) (0.258) (0.0301) 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-3.260 6.230* 1.857 2.372 9.072 
(0.416) (0.0994) (0.795) (0.810) (0.447) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
1.976* 0.790 2.595 2.706 0.0783 
(0.0728) (0.493) (0.139) (0.288) (0.983) 
Primary 
Shares (%) 
-
19.53*** -17.00*** 
-
37.09*** 
-
52.05*** 
-
59.03*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
7.718*** 1.287 4.741 5.622 6.305 
(0.008) (0.682) (0.175) (0.280) (0.432) 
Volatility -
510.7*** -114.1 
-
585.8*** 
-
716.9*** -812.6** 
(0.000) (0.409) (0.004) (0.009) (0.0246) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.903 2.591* 1.241 3.532 8.871 
(0.230) (0.0538) (0.677) (0.376) (0.107) 
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(Table 2.12 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Leverage 10.22** -4.751** 1.963 1.064 -1.760 
(0.0101) (0.0473) (0.668) (0.847) (0.797) 
Firm Age 0.0350 -0.0382 -0.0115 0.144 -0.0126 
(0.462) (0.422) (0.891) (0.267) (0.944) 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-9.274* -8.147 -13.93* -5.422 -17.84 
(0.0572) (0.128) (0.0979) (0.679) (0.350) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.110* -1.326** -0.137 0.577 2.470 
(0.0992) (0.0417) (0.899) (0.744) (0.367) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.94** -5.890 -19.06** -11.53 -22.76 
(0.0334) (0.372) (0.0344) (0.414) (0.267) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-5.171* -0.223 -5.970 -12.30* -8.847 
(0.0662) (0.932) (0.213) (0.0768) (0.389) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-2.198 0.283 -1.066 -0.838 -2.301 
(0.505) (0.934) (0.829) (0.907) (0.798) 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
3.515* 0.792 4.477 13.91** 14.89 
(0.0662) (0.668) (0.178) (0.0367) (0.209) 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.314 2.849 5.323 1.920 3.853 
(0.699) (0.443) (0.352) (0.822) (0.751) 
Underpricing -8.098* -0.910 -10.58 -13.61 -28.38** 
(0.0977) (0.868) (0.209) (0.222) (0.0205) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-0.0859 -10.10 -4.903 -19.03 -4.066 
(0.991) (0.270) (0.700) (0.280) (0.885) 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-7.996 -11.10* -14.34 7.366 11.17 
(0.153) (0.0850) (0.135) (0.648) (0.557) 
Constant 78.60*** 8.363 95.09* 177.2** 152.0 
 
(0.00743) (0.759) (0.0592) (0.0213) (0.183) 
Annual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 856 856 856 753 623 
R-squared 0.134 0.102 0.124 0.190 0.168 
Panel C: Size and Book to Market Adjusted     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Multiple 
Lockup 
Indicator 
-1.467 6.979 4.320 -11.56 -27.59** 
(0.760) (0.215) (0.581) (0.318) (0.0324) 
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(Table 2.12 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Venture 
Capital 
Indicator 
-3.753 6.573* 1.761 2.143 9.225 
(0.362) (0.0837) (0.809) (0.832) (0.442) 
Lead 
Underwriter 
Rank 
1.969* 0.768 2.572 2.908 0.243 
(0.0761) (0.507) (0.144) (0.256) (0.948) 
Primary 
Shares (%) -19.47*** -18.00*** 
-
37.76*** 
-
52.82*** -67.62*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00107) 
Book-to-
Market Ratio 
7.732*** 1.361 4.812 5.698 7.523 
(0.00810) (0.665) (0.167) (0.368) (0.467) 
Volatility 
-514.5*** -83.48 
-
574.3*** 
-
753.9*** -948.2** 
(0.000) (0.549) (0.005) (0.008) (0.0116) 
Total Assets 
(log) 
-1.936 2.613* 1.256 3.263 7.725 
(0.239) (0.0555) (0.680) (0.436) (0.190) 
Leverage 10.05** -4.631* 1.925 1.191 -0.524 
(0.0118) (0.0529) (0.675) (0.849) (0.948) 
Firm Age 0.0311 -0.0375 -0.0150 0.134 0.00177 
(0.515) (0.431) (0.859) (0.305) (0.992) 
Dual Share 
Class 
Indicator 
-9.607* -7.981 -14.00* -6.133 -21.92 
(0.0503) (0.135) (0.0964) (0.647) (0.260) 
Number of 
Analysts 
1.142* -1.263* -0.0648 0.828 2.370 
(0.0952) (0.0550) (0.953) (0.649) (0.413) 
Intangible 
Assets (%) 
-11.83** -4.832 -18.18** -9.068 -20.45 
(0.0362) (0.466) (0.0444) (0.523) (0.321) 
Proceeds 
(log) 
-5.402* -0.499 -6.477 -12.97* -6.954 
(0.0640) (0.852) (0.190) (0.0811) (0.544) 
High Tech 
Indicator 
-1.789 0.652 -0.460 -1.068 -3.673 
(0.590) (0.851) (0.926) (0.882) (0.684) 
Shares 
Locked Up 
(%) 
3.529* 0.764 4.462 13.96** 16.02 
(0.0675) (0.677) (0.181) (0.0381) (0.192) 
NYSE 
Indicator 
1.592 3.500 5.954 3.131 1.717 
(0.643) (0.350) (0.300) (0.716) (0.890) 
Underpricing -8.300* -0.636 -10.51 -14.82 -30.44** 
(0.0919) (0.908) (0.212) (0.187) (0.0140) 
Short Length 
Indicator 
-0.365 -9.664 -4.958 -19.44 -5.268 
(0.961) (0.293) (0.699) (0.274) (0.850) 
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(Table 2.12 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  6 months 
2nd 6 
months 1 year 2 year 3 year 
Long Length 
Indicator 
-8.484 -11.02* -14.78 6.223 10.94 
(0.137) (0.0904) (0.127) (0.701) (0.567) 
Constant 81.62*** 10.23 100.4* 183.4** 170.1 
 
(0.00718) (0.713) (0.0529) (0.0235) (0.169) 
Annual 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 846 846 846 738 605 
R-squared 0.132 0.102 0.122 0.190 0.169 
This table reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the buy and hold 
long run returns for IPO firms.  Observations are for firms with an IPO between 2001 
and 2012 inclusive excluding firms whose offering price is less than $5, ADRs, non-
common stock offerings, REITs, mutual to stock conversions, equity carveouts, spinoffs, 
or closed end funds.  The CRSP value weighted index is used for the market 
adjustment. For size matched BHARs, the market value for the non-issuing firms is 
determined at the end of each month while the market value for the issuing firms is 
taken on the date of their first appearance in CRSP.  On this date, the issuing firm is 
matched to the next largest firm.  If the matched firm is delisted, the issuing firm is then 
matched to the next largest firm.  For book-to-market matching, size deciles are 
determined based on NYSE firms at the end of each month.  Each issuing firm with a 
positive book-to-market value is then matched to the firm in its size decile that has the 
closest book-to-market value.   Again, should the matched firm be delisted, the match is 
replaced by the firm in the issuer’s size decile with the next nearest book-to-market 
value.  For those issuers with zero or negative book-to-market values, the match is the 
non-issuing firm closest in size that also has a zero or negative book-to-market ratio.  In 
all cases, matching firms must have at least 5 years of return data, must not have 
issued equity within the past 5 years, and must have a single class of stock outstanding 
to be an eligible match. The variable high tech is an indicator that is set to 1 if the firm is 
an industry defined as a technology industry as in Cliff and Denis (2004).  Number of 
analysts is from I/B/E/S coverage in the third month following IPO.  Firm age, the dual 
class indicator, which has a value of 1 if the firm has multiple classes of stock 
outstanding, and the lead underwriter ranking were obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.  
Underpricing is the percent difference between the offering price and the first day’s 
closing price.  Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model residual over 
seventy days prior to lockup expiration excluding the 20 days prior to lockup.  Runup is 
the cumulative return from IPO until day -20. Robust p-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we explore multiple aspects of firms’ IPO lockup decisions.  We 
re-examine previous findings regarding lockup length choice and market reaction upon 
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lockup expiration using more recent data.  More importantly, we extend the lockup 
literature in several areas that, to our knowledge, are not represented in the extant 
literature.  Firms with higher book-to-market values and those with dual class share 
structures are more likely to use multiple lockups while those with firms with more 
primary shares sold are less likely to use a staged lockup arrangement. 
 In addition to the type of firms using multiple lockups, we explore the market’s 
reaction to these agreements.  We find that abnormal trading volume falls monotonically 
with lockup release order.  Perhaps of more practical importance we find that for the 
third or subsequent lockup, the market does not react reliably negatively as it does for 
the single lockups that have previously been explored.  While we cannot strongly say 
that the reaction is positive, the evidence tends in that direction.  For the long run 
market response, results indicate that firms with multiple lockups underperform over the 
three years following IPO, but not in the six month, one year, or two year subperiods.  
We do find that those firms with more primary shares sold in the initial offering 
consistently underperform regardless of the subperiod in question. 
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Chapter 3.  Accelerated Share Repurchases 
3.1 Introduction 
In contrast to those firms undertaking an equity offering, others have a need to 
disgorge themselves of cash and return the proceeds of their enterprise to stockholders.  
For much of the twentieth century, dividends were by far the primary means for doing 
so.  However, in the 1980’s the prevalence of stock repurchase programs began to 
grow at a rate far exceeding that of dividends with repurchases exceeding dividends (in 
dollar terms) by 1999 (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  Although several methods of 
repurchase have been used including fixed price tender offers and dutch auctions, the 
open market repurchase (OMR) has historically been the dominant form with Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000) finding them to be responsible for 91% of the value of repurchases 
over the 1980-1999 period.  More recently a relatively new form of open market 
repurchase has gained in popularity, the accelerated share repurchase (ASR). 
Bargeron, Kulchania and Thomas (2011) report a total of 13 ASRs between the 
years 1996-2003.  As shown in Table 3.1, we find an equal number in 2004 alone, 
which rises over the next 3 years before falling in 2008.  Beginning in 2010, the number 
of ASRs begins to recover and becomes increasingly numerous in comparison to OMRs 
in the post financial crisis era. 
  Like the OMR, shares under an ASR are purchased in the open market; 
however, the purchasing firm in an ASR contracts with an investment bank as an 
intermediary to deliver to the firm a substantial portion of the repurchase program 
immediately by borrowing those shares.  The intermediary then covers its short position 
over the time frame specified in the contract (typically several months) through open 
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Table 3.1: Annual Sample Distribution by Repurchase Type 
 
    
 
OMR ASR 
Year 
Mean 
Program Size 
(million) N % 
Mean 
Program 
Size 
(million) N % 
2004 624.1 565 97.9% 462.7 12 2.1% 
2005 639.3 655 95.9% 486.7 28 4.1% 
2006 686.7 669 96.1% 314.3 27 3.9% 
2007 693.6 840 92.8% 770.9 65 7.2% 
2008 360.7 738 97.9% 340.3 16 2.1% 
2009 421.9 288 98.3% 756.7 5 1.7% 
2010 823.1 460 96.4% 296.7 17 3.6% 
2011 507.2 575 95.5% 261.7 27 4.5% 
2012 927.1 435 95.4% 870.7 21 4.6% 
2013 1,027.6 429 91.5% 673.1 40 8.5% 
2014 480.4 530 90.4% 556.2 56 9.6% 
2004-2014 
 
6184 95.2% 
 
314 4.8% 
Table 3.1 displays the annual distributions of sample ASR and OMR firms along with 
their respective share of the distribution for the year.  Data is from Thomson Reuter’s 
SDC platinum database.   
 
market purchases.  Although the purchaser may specify the number of shares to be 
repurchased, more typically a program value is specified, and the number of shares 
delivered are based on the closing price.  Because the actual prices paid by the 
intermediary are almost sure to vary as shares are repurchased, the contracts contain 
provisions for a cash or stock settlement to be made based upon the weighted average 
purchase price.  In exchange for its’ role in the ASR the intermediary is paid a 
commission for each share delivered.  As a result of the average price settlement 
feature, the purchasing firm bears all price risk. 
From the above description, the tradeoffs of the ASR versus the more traditional 
OMR become immediately obvious.  In exchange for giving up any flexibility in the 
actual price paid for the shares, the repurchasing firm receives an immediate, 
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substantial reduction in the number of shares outstanding. The ASR represents a gain 
in immediacy at the cost of flexibility and the potential of paying a higher price per share 
than if the company were to conduct market repurchases at its discretion. An ASR 
further reduces flexibility as the contract locks in either the dollar value of the program of 
the number of shares whereas a firm conducting an OMR retains the option to not fulfill 
the announced program.  
A number of possible reasons for employing an ASR rather than an OMR have 
been proposed in the extant literature including as signals by management to show their 
willingness to quickly return cash to stockholders or their belief that the stock is 
undervalued, to defend against takeovers, to adjust the firm’s capital structure, or to 
manage earnings per share (Bargeron et. al, 2011).  Chemmanur et. al (2010) also 
propose that ASRs may be used to combat dilution resulting from employee stock 
programs. In this paper, we explore one possible explanation for why firms would 
accept this loss of flexibility in exchange for an immediate reduction in shares 
outstanding.  Specifically, we posit that firms are willing to accept the costs of the ASR 
to increase earnings per share (EPS) relative to analysts’ expectations.  Because ASRs 
deliver shares more immediately than an OMR, they provide a more impactful reduction 
in the number of shares outstanding for the announcement quarter.  Since earnings are 
divided by a fewer number of shares, this reduction has the potential to inflate reported 
EPS. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  We survey the relevant literature in section 2.  
We describe our empirical methods in section 3.  We present and discuss the results in 
section 4, and we draw our conclusions in section 5. 
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3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Firms were, until the 1980’s, exceedingly hesitant to repurchase shares even 
though this form carried real world tax benefits for shareholders.  This hesitancy is even 
more puzzling given earlier theoretical work (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) showing that, 
under perfect market assumptions, the choice to pay out through dividends or 
repurchases should be irrelevant.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) attribute this lack of 
repurchase activity to corporate concerns that such a program would be seen by the 
SEC as an attempt to manipulate price.  However, in 1982, the SEC adopted the safe 
harbor rule, Rule 10b-183, which provides guidelines under which firms may repurchase 
shares with the presumption that they were not influencing price.  
A number of prior works study the flexibility offered by an OMR.  Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) find that although the majority of shares announced (74-82%) are 
actually repurchased in the subsequent three years, nearly 17% of firms purchase fewer 
than 20% of the shares announced with 10% of firms purchasing fewer than 10% of 
announced shares and more than 6% of firms purchasing substantially no shares. An 
OMR also provides substantial flexibility not only in the amount of shares to repurchase 
but also in the timing of cash disbursements.  Both Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) demonstrate this flexibility by linking the 
choice between dividends and repurchases to the perceived permanence of the cash 
being paid out. Because of the semi-permanent nature of dividends, firms would rather 
                                            
3 Rule 10b-18 limits daily purchases to 25% of daily volume averaged over the 
previous 4 weeks, requires each day’s purchases to be made through a single broker or 
dealer, forbids purchases in the opening or closing half-hours of trading, and prohibits 
purchases above either the last market purchase price or highest independent bid price.   
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not pay out temporary boons to cash by increasing dividends to unsustainable levels.  
Instead, a repurchase allows for the disbursement of excess cash without committing 
the firm to maintain these payouts in the future.  The dearth of tender offers relative to 
OMRs in works such as Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) speak to the value of the flexibility 
inherent in the OMR.  
In contrast, ASRs sacrifice the flexibility of the OMR for the immediacy of share 
delivery.  Bagnoli, Gordan, and Lipman (1989) present a model in which share 
repurchases can serve as an effective takeover defense by signaling managements’ 
private information thereby raising the firm’s stock price to a level, which prevents a 
successful takeover.  Because of the more immediate and inflexible nature of an ASR, 
the use of the form should provide a stronger, more credible signal than an OMR.  
Additionally, an OMR can serve as a takeover deterrent as Billet and Xue (2007) 
document that OMR authorization is related to a heightened latent takeover probability.  
Akyol, Kim and Shekhar (2014) find this deterrent effect to be even stronger for those 
firms choosing an ASR while Bargeron et. al (2011) find that ASR firms are significantly 
more likely than OMR firms to have been a takeover target within the 6 months prior to 
the repurchase announcement.   
Closely related to the immediacy of an ASR is the credibility provided by the 
contractually obligated nature of the repurchase.  The initiation of a repurchase is often 
seen as a signal by management of the firm’s undervaluation (Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 
1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991). The latter two works find a more significant market 
reaction for repurchases in the form of a tender offer than for OMRs. In this sense, we 
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would expect the ASR to function more like a tender offer than an OMR because it 
entails a commitment to purchase and not simply the intention to do so.  This conjecture 
is supported by the findings of Chemmanur, Cheng and Zheng (2010); however, 
Bargeron et. al (2011) fail to detect a significant difference between the market 
reactions to ASRs and OMRs either in a univariate or multivariate setting.  Bonaime 
(2012) considers the increased credibility of an ASR in the context of poor reputation 
firms that have previously authorized low completion OMRs and finds that these firms 
are more likely to announce more credible ASRs in the future to counteract the poor 
sentiment resulting from the prior OMR. 
The quicker impact to earnings per share may also represent another, more 
relevant to this study, need for the immediacy provided by an ASR.  In a survey of 
CFOs, Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) report that 75% deem increasing 
earnings per share as either important or very important to repurchase decisions 
compared to only 9.2% of CFOs who rank increasing EPS as not important or not 
important at all.  Because an ASR lowers the number of shares outstanding more 
quickly than an OMR, it should be a more effective tool in increasing EPS.  Marquardt, 
Tan and Young (2009) find positive relationships between EPS accretative repurchases 
and CEO compensation that is explicitly tied to EPS and the choice of an ASR.  
However, they do not consider analysts expectations in their study. Additionally, they 
document a link between the use of ASRs and voluntary CEO turnover subsequent to 
repurchase. 
A large body of literature concerns the effects of either meeting or failing to meet 
these analysts’ expectations.  Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) examines the 
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distribution of earnings relative to expectations and document an unusually low number 
of observations that fall just short of expectations along with an abnormally high volume 
that just meet them.  Burgstahler and Eames (2006) corroborate these findings.  
Degeorge et. al (1999) also finds an underrepresentation of large positive earnings 
surprises, which they attribute to “saving for a better tomorrow.”   Brown and Caylor 
(2005) find that, beginning in the mid-1990’s” the avoidance of negative quarterly 
earnings surprises becomes the most relevant benchmark compared to avoiding 
negative earnings or earnings decreases.  The market rewards firms that meet these 
expectations with greater valuations for firms that consistently do so (Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002), and even does so when earnings were likely managed to achieve the 
benchmark albeit to a lesser degree (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002).  Most closely 
related to our study, Hribnar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006) find a significantly large 
number of firms, which would have missed earnings expectations by a cent without 
repurchasing shares through an OMR program. 
3.3 Empirical Method 
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
To construct our sample, we begin by obtaining all repurchase announcements 
from 2004-2014 by US firms from Thomson Reuter’s SDC platinum database.  In 
addition to those observations flagged by SDC as ASRs, we search the deal synopses 
for “accelerated”, and we look through negotiated transactions for which the 
counterparty is an investment bank.  For these alternative methods, we check SEC 
filings to determine whether the repurchase truly is an ASR.  SDC also provides OMRs 
for comparison.  Using these methods we yield an initial sample of 325 ASRs and 6730 
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OMRs.  Because ASRs are often undertaken as part of an ongoing open market 
program, we match each ASR to a preceding OMR when possible to prevent 
comparison between an ASR and the OMR for which it is a constituent.  We also use 
Compustat to confirm the nation of the repurchasing firms, which reduces the number of 
OMRs in the sample to 6184, and the number of ASRs to 314. From SDC we also 
obtain data regarding attempted takeovers of sample firms and equity issuance by 
sample firms.  Accounting variables are taken from Compustat while CRSP provides 
pricing, return and trade volume information.  We obtain from I/B/E/S analysts 
expectations, actual EPS, and earnings announcement dates.  
3.3.2 Variable Construction 
Return Std. Dev is the standard deviation of returns over a period beginning 255 days 
prior to program announcement and ending 46 days prior as in Bargeron et. al (2011). 
Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor which measures daily absolute return 
scaled by dollar trading volume averaged over the same period as Return Std. Dev. 
Assets is the book value of total assets from Compustat annual data at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding repurchase initiation.  
Cash is cash and equivalents assets from Compustat annual data at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding repurchase initiation.  
Free Cash Flow is free cash flows as in Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) 
measured as gross operating income less depreciation, tax payments, interest expense, 
and total dividends scaled by total assets. 
Free Cash Flow Std. Dev. is the 5 year standard deviation of the above free cash flow 
measure. 
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High-hedge and Low-hedge are similarly based on Acharya, Almeida and Campello 
(2007) and are determined by the three year correlation between free cash flow and 3 
digit SIC industry median research and development expenses.  Correlations less than -
0.2 results in a value of 1 for Highhedge while correlations greater than 0.2 results in a 
value of 1 for Lowhedge. 
Market-to-book is firm market capitalization scaled by the book value of equity defined 
as in Fama and French (1993) as stockholders equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
plus investment tax credits, if applicable, less the value of preferred stock where 
preferred stock is measured, in order of preference, by redemption, liquidation, or par 
value.  Values are Compustat annual values at fiscal year end prior to repurchase.   
Takeover is a dummy variable indicated whether the firm has been the target of a 
takeover attempt, according to SDC, in the 6 months prior to repurchase. 
Ratio is based on the quarterly Compustat variable cshfdq, which records the number of 
shares outstanding used to determine fully diluted EPS.  Ratio is calculated as the 
current value divided by the lagged value and is used as indicator of the effect of the 
repurchase on available shares in the quarter of authorization. 
As if EPS is the product of Ratio and EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, EPS_actual, which 
serves as an estimate of earnings per share absent repurchase. 
Prior stock performance is the market model cumulative abnormal returns over days -44 
through -4 prior to the repurchase announcement. 
Equity offering is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm conducts a 
seasoned equity offering during the repurchase quarter. Offer information is obtained 
from the SDC New Issues database. 
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Stock split or Dividend is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
undergoes a stock split or issues a stock dividend during the repurchase quarter. Data 
for the variable comes from CRSP. 
Negative Earnings is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has negative 
earnings for the quarter based on the actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S. 
Discretionary Accruals is a measure of discretionary accruals calculated using quarterly 
data based on the modified Jones (1991) method proposed by Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995). 
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the sample split by repurchase type.  
We test differences in means via t-test and differences in medians using a Wilcoxon 
rank sum test.   
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
N OMR N ASR Difference 
Assets [Mean] 6151 12,948 314 18,821 -5,873 
[Median] 
 
1,041 
 
5,301 -4261*** 
ln(Assets) 
 
6151 7.070 314 8.576 -1.506*** 
  
6.948 
 
0.148 6.800*** 
Cash/Assets 
 
6151 0.174 314 0.148 0.026** 
  
0.099 
 
0.095 0.005 
ln(Illiquidity) 
 
6019 
-
19.213 314 
-
22.083 2.870*** 
  
-
19.763 
 
-
22.183 2.420*** 
Return Std. Dev. 
 
6019 0.023 314 0.017 0.006*** 
  
0.019 
 
0.015 0.005*** 
Market Value Equity 
 
5814 6,730 303 10,858 -4128*** 
  
878 
 
4,891 -4014*** 
Book Value Equity 
Growth  
5801 0.996 303 0.083 0.913 
  
0.094 
 
0.073 0.021*** 
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 (Table 3.2 continued) 
  
N OMR N ASR Difference 
Beta [Mean] 5427 1.131 307 1.092 0.040 
[Median 
 
1.004 
 
1.010 -0.006 
Free Cash Flow 
 
4659 0.039 275 0.060 -0.021 
  
0.046 
 
0.052 -0.006*** 
Free Cash Flow Std. 
Dev.  
4063 0.061 270 0.026 0.035** 
  
0.026 
 
0.017 0.009*** 
High-hedge 
 
4667 0.290 278 0.385 -0.095*** 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 0*** 
Low-hedge 
 
4667 0.624 278 0.514 0.109*** 
  
1.000 
 
1.000 0*** 
Market to Book 
 
5814 -12.438 303 1.779 -14.217 
  
1.902 
 
2.211 -0.309*** 
ln(Market to Book) 
 
5755 0.725 301 0.823 -0.098** 
  
0.653 
 
0.796 -0.142*** 
Leverage 
 
4698 0.412 276 0.392 0.020 
  
0.353 
 
0.403 -0.050*** 
Return on Assets 
 
5812 0.036 298 0.044 -0.008 
  
0.032 
 
0.038 -0.006*** 
Profit Margin 
 
5804 -0.451 298 0.208 -0.659 
  
0.180 
 
0.167 0.013 
Program size (% of 
shares outstanding)  
6080 32.465 309 5.972 26.493 
  
5.570 
 
4.456 1.114*** 
Prior Stock 
Performance  
5925 -0.044 313 -0.006 -0.038*** 
  
-0.029 
 
-0.002 -0.028*** 
Net PPE/assets 
 
6123 0.164 311 0.223 -0.059*** 
  
0.077 
 
0.144 -0.067*** 
Takeover 
 
6184 0.004 314 0.057 -0.053*** 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 0*** 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the sample.  The sample originates from SDC 
platinum repurchase data and consists of the identifiable ASR and OMR repurchases 
over the years 2004-2014.  Assets is Compustat total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the repurchase announcement.  Ln(assets) is the natural log of total assets.  
Cash/assets is cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to repurchase. Ln(Illiquidity) is the natural log of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure.  Return Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of returns over a period beginning 
255 days prior to repurchase announcement and ending 46 days prior.  The market 
value of equity is the product of  share price and number of shares outstanding at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to repurchase.  Book value equity growth is the book value of 
equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to repurchase less the value one year prior 
scaled by the lagged value.  The book value of equity is determined as in Fama and 
French (1993).  Beta is the beta coefficient of a 60-month market model regression 
ending the month prior to the earnings announcement following the repurchase quarter.  
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Free cash flow is a measure of  free cash flow as in Acharya et al. (2007).  Free cash 
flow std. dev is the 5-year standard deviation of the free cash flow measure.  High-
hedge is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 3-year correlation between 
free cash flow and 3 digit sic industry median research and development expense is 
less than -0.2.  Low-hedge is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 3 year 
correlation between free cash flow and 3 digit sic industry median research and 
development expense is greater than 0.2. All free cash flow measures are at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement. Market to book is the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Ln(market to book) is the natural log 
of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Leverage is the sum of 
long-term debt and total current liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to the repurchase announcement. Return on assets is operating income 
before depreciation divided by total assets less cash and equivalents as in Chemmanur 
et al (2010). Profit margin is operating income before depreciation divided by sales also 
as in Chemmanur et. al (2010).  Return on assets and Profit margin are measured for 
the quarter in which the repurchase announcement is made.  Program size is the 
number of shares authorized for repurchase divided by the number of shares 
outstanding and is taken from SDC. Prior stock performance is the market model 
cumulative abnormal returns over days -44 through -4 prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Net PPE/assets is the net value of plant, property, and equipment 
divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Takeover is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
repurchasing firm was the target of a takeover attempt in the 6 months preceding the 
repurchase announcement.  Takeover attempts are obtained from the SDC mergers 
and acquisitions database. Differences in means (medians) are test using a t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test). *, **, & *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, & 0.01 
levels respectively. 
 
Those firms undertaking ASRs are generally larger than firms conducting the 
more traditional OMR whether measured by book assets or market capitalization though 
only the differences in medians show significance.  However, the size of an ASR tends 
to be smaller than an OMR.  Evidence on cash holdings is mixed with OMR firms having 
weakly significant mean holdings while the median cash levels are insignificantly greater 
for ASR firms.  Leverage is similarly mixed with ASRs having the higher median but 
lower mean leverage.  Consistent with the need for flexibility, OMR firms have 
significantly more volatile share prices as reflected by the higher standard deviation of 
returns.   ASR firms exhibit significantly higher and less volatile free cash flows, which 
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may indicate the use of an ASR as a more credible means for management to signal its 
intent to return cash to shareholders.   
 In contrast to Bargeron et. al (2011), we find that ASR firms more frequently 
exhibit a strong negative correlation between cash flows and investment needs (high 
hedge) and less frequently show a strong positive correlation in comparison to OMR 
firms.  ASR firms typically have a higher market to book value and median growth in the 
value of book equity is significantly lower than OMR firms. Prior stock performance is 
significantly better for ASR firms, which is not consistent with ASR use as a signal of 
undervaluation.  Lastly, the much greater proportion of ASR firms having experienced 
takeover bids corroborates prior findings concerning the use of an ASR as a takeover 
defense mechanism.   
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Logit Regression of Repurchase Type 
 To test the effect of earnings expectations on the choice to repurchase using an 
ASR or OMR, we estimate “as if” earnings that reflect EPS in the absence of a 
repurchase by scaling the number of shares used to calculate EPS in the repurchase 
quarter by the prior quarter’s shares then multiplying that ratio by actual EPS.  For 
consistency with prior literature and practice, we round these estimates to two decimal 
places. We then compare these estimated earnings to median analyst expectations and 
categorize each firm as miss, just miss, just beat, or beat.  Firms whose EPS fall short 
of expectations by a cent are categorized as just miss while those further below 
expectations are classified as miss.  Those firms that meet expectations or exceed by a 
cent are classified just beat while those that further out perform expectations are a beat.  
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We then conduct logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator taking a 
value of 1 for firms conducting an ASR and 0 for OMR firms.  We create indicators for 
each EPS categorization and include a number of other variables that have been shown 
to affect the decision to conduct an ASR.  Table 3.3 presents the results of these 
regressions. 
Specifications 1 through 4 include an indicator for each EPS category so that we 
can estimate the impact of all categories on the repurchase decision.  Because the data 
requirements for the free cash flow related variables greatly limit the number of 
observations, we exclude these measures in specifications 1 through 4. In specification 
1 we find that Miss firms are significantly more likely to elect to repurchase through an 
ASR, which is consistent with these firms needing the more immediate reduction in 
shares that an ASR provides to meet expectations.  Specification 3 shows that firms 
that expect to meet or just beat expectations are much less likely to incur the costs of an 
ASR and instead choose an OMR.  Firms that expect to fall just short of expectations or 
comfortably exceed them do not exhibit a significant preference for either repurchase 
type.  In specifications 5 and 6, we reexamine the miss and just beat firms and include 
the free cash flow variables; the results remain consistent with specifications 1 and 3.   
 Results for the variables that have previously been linked to the repurchase 
decision remain largely consistent with the extant literature.  Firm size, illiquidity, and 
market to book ratio are negatively related to ASR selection as is stock volatility, though 
not significantly so, while firms with better stock performance and those that have been 
takeover targets are more likely to choose an ASR. 
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Table 3.3: Logit Regression of Repurchase Type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR 
Miss 
0.457*** 
   
0.488*** 
   (3.041) 
   
(3.048) 
   
Just Miss 
 
-0.00261 
   
-0.175 
  
 
(-0.0103) 
   
(-0.642) 
  
Just Beat 
  
-0.279 
   
-0.225 
 
  
(-1.260) 
   
(-0.965) 
 
Beat 
   
-0.260* 
   
-0.263* 
   
(-1.859) 
   
(-1.755) 
Return Std. Dev. 
-19.66** -18.85* -19.18** -18.75* -13.59 -12.76 -12.76 -12.66 
(-2.060) (-1.944) (-1.974) (-1.954) (-1.421) (-1.327) (-1.327) (-1.323) 
ln(Illiquidity) 
-0.620*** -0.626*** -0.614*** -0.633*** -0.806*** -0.818*** -0.804*** -0.827*** 
(-6.705) (-6.797) (-6.560) (-6.852) (-6.647) (-6.830) (-6.605) (-6.853) 
ln(Assets) 
-0.289*** -0.306*** -0.297*** -0.306*** -0.535*** -0.559*** -0.547*** -0.561*** 
(-2.793) (-2.957) (-2.841) (-2.947) (-4.009) (-4.248) (-4.109) (-4.244) 
Cash/Assets 
0.186 0.0483 0.0732 0.117 0.551 0.404 0.431 0.461 
(0.352) (0.0905) (0.137) (0.220) (0.879) (0.637) (0.683) (0.733) 
Program size (% of 
shares 
outstanding) 
-0.0828*** -0.0795*** -0.0806*** -0.0799*** -0.0877*** -0.0849*** -0.0855*** -0.0855*** 
(-4.217) (-4.068) (-4.111) (-4.089) (-4.256) (-4.138) (-4.161) (-4.158) 
Prior Stock 
Performance 
1.932*** 1.856*** 1.858*** 1.878*** 1.690*** 1.636*** 1.613*** 1.647*** 
(3.628) (3.501) (3.490) (3.548) (3.014) (2.954) (2.899) (2.971) 
ln(Market to Book) 
-0.486*** -0.498*** -0.484*** -0.510*** -0.594*** -0.614*** -0.601*** -0.630*** 
(-3.266) (-3.323) (-3.230) (-3.396) (-3.165) (-3.270) (-3.164) (-3.352) 
Takeover 
2.320*** 2.261*** 2.244*** 2.313*** 2.312*** 2.240*** 2.234*** 2.312*** 
(5.873) (5.793) (5.766) (5.831) (5.620) (5.557) (5.542) (5.670) 
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(Table 3.3 Continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR ASR 
Leverage 
0.0697 0.0653 0.0597 0.0774 0.309 0.282 0.275 0.313 
(0.634) (0.570) (0.504) (0.719) (1.570) (1.441) (1.403) (1.582) 
Free Cash Flow 
    
0.530 0.578 0.634 0.516 
    
(0.286) (0.312) (0.345) (0.277) 
Free Cash Flow 
Std. Dev     
-8.736** -9.126** -9.118** -8.716** 
    
(-2.065) (-2.143) (-2.144) (-2.072) 
High-hedge 
    
-0.0142 0.00955 0.00724 -0.0178 
    
(-0.0560) (0.0377) (0.0287) (-0.0704) 
Low-Hedge 
    
-0.556** -0.541** -0.536** -0.565** 
    
(-2.175) (-2.121) (-2.104) (-2.208) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -13.74*** -13.63*** -13.38*** -13.68*** -15.77*** -15.67*** -15.45*** -15.75*** 
 
(-10.10) (-10.14) (-9.741) (-10.17) (-9.561) (-9.645) (-9.264) (-9.635) 
Observations 4,556 4,556 4,556 4,556 3,779 3,779 3,779 3,779 
Table 3.3 presents results of a logit regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for 
repurchases conducted using an ASR and 0 for repurchases conducted under an OMR without an ASR component. Miss, 
Just Miss, Just Beat, and Beat are indicator variables that take a value of 1 if the as if earnings per share fall within the 
specified category.  As if EPS is calculated as actual earnings multiplied by the number of shares used to calculated EPS 
divided by the previous quarter’s shares and is an estimate of EPS in the absence of repurchase. As if EPS is then 
compared to median analyst expectations from I/B/E/S. Those firms that are 1 cent shy of meeting expectation are 
classified as Just Miss. Those that are further below expectations are classified as Miss.  Firms that either meet 
expectations or exceed them by no more than 1 cent are classified as Just Beat.  Firms with higher earnings are classified 
as Beat. Assets is Compustat total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement.  Ln(assets) 
is the natural log of total assets.  Cash/assets is cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to repurchase. Ln(Illiquidity) is the natural log of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  Return Std. Dev. is the 
standard deviation of returns over a period beginning 255 days prior to repurchase announcement and ending 46 days 
prior.  The market value of equity is the product of  share price and number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal 
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year prior to repurchase.  The book value of equity is determined as in Fama and 
French (1993).  Ln(market to book) is the natural log of the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity. Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and total 
current liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
repurchase announcement. Free cash flow is a measure of  free cash flow as in 
Acharya et al. (2007).  Free cash flow std. dev is the 5-year standard deviation of the 
free cash flow measure.  High-hedge is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the 3-year correlation between free cash flow and 3 digit sic industry median research 
and development expense is less than -0.2.  Low-hedge is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the 3 year correlation between free cash flow and 3 digit sic 
industry median research and development expense is greater than 0.2. All free cash 
flow measures are at the end of the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement. 
Takeover is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the repurchasing firm was the 
target of a takeover attempt in the 6 months preceding the repurchase announcement.  
Takeover attempts are obtained from the SDC mergers and acquisitions database. 
Program size is the number of shares authorized for repurchase divided by the number 
of shares outstanding and is taken from SDC. Prior stock performance is the market 
model cumulative abnormal returns over days -44 through -4 prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Industry effects are based on the Fama and French 12 industry 
classifications. 
 
3.4.2 Change in earnings categorization 
 We next investigate the impact that the repurchase form has on realized earnings 
as compared to earnings absent repurchase.  As before we assign each firm to miss, 
just miss, just beat, and beat categories based on their “as if” earnings.  We then assign 
firms to the same categories based on their actual earnings compared to analyst 
expectations.  We assign a value of 1 to miss firms, 2 to just miss firms, 3 to just beat 
firms, and 4 to beat firms.  We then subtract the as if value from the actual value to 
determine the impact of the repurchase decision on earnings performance.  For 
example, a firm that is a miss based on as if earnings that ultimately meets expectations 
would have a difference of 2.  We regress this difference on variables impacting EPS 
using ordered logit.  We include indicators for seasoned equity offerings and stock splits 
as these events impact the number of shares outstanding, and we include discretionary 
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accruals, which affect the EPS numerator.  Also included is an indicator for firms that 
have negative earnings as a reduction in shares outstanding for these firms reduces 
earnings per share.  Industry and annual fixed effects are included.  Table 3.4 presents 
results.  
Table 3.4: Ordered Logit of Change in Earnings Categorization 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DIF DIF DIF DIF 
     
ASR 0.856***  0.932***  
(5.511)  (4.482)  
Equity Offering -0.254 -0.274 -1.517 -1.540 
(-0.265) (-0.301) (-1.607) (-1.611) 
Stock Split or Dividend -2.427*** -2.396*** -2.249*** -2.153*** 
(-8.141) (-8.202) (-4.386) (-4.319) 
Negative Earnings -0.243** -0.297*** -0.345** -0.371** 
(-2.400) (-2.922) (-2.315) (-2.467) 
ASRxMiss  1.991***  2.086*** 
 (8.416)  (6.676) 
ASRxJust Miss  3.054***  2.944*** 
 (18.74)  (12.54) 
ASRxJust Beat  0.523  0.795 
 (0.760)  (1.063) 
Discretionary Accruals   -1.376 -1.387 
  (-1.630) (-1.614) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,245 5,245 2,353 2,353 
Table 3.4 presents ordered logit regression results where the dependent variable is the 
difference between the earnings classification for actual EPS and the as if EPS 
classification. As if EPS is calculated as actual EPS multiplied by the number of shares 
used to calculated EPS divided by the previous quarter’s shares and is an estimate of 
EPS in the absence of repurchase. As if and actual EPS are then compared to median 
analyst expectations from I/B/E/S. Those firms that are 1 cent shy of meeting 
expectation are classified as Just Miss. Those that are further below expectations are 
classified as Miss.  Firms that either meet expectations or exceed them by no more than 
1 cent are classified as Just Beat.  Firms with higher earnings are classified as Beat.  
Miss is assigned a value of 1, Just Miss a value of 2, Just Beat a value of 3, and Beat a 
value of 4. The difference between the actual and as if EPS classification forms the 
dependent variable. ASR is an indicator that takes a value of 1 for repurchases 
conducted using an ASR and 0 for repurchases conducted under an OMR without an 
ASR component. Equity offering is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
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had a seasoned equity offering during the repurchase quarter.  Seasoned equity 
offerings are obtained from the SDC New Issues database. Stock Split or Dividend is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm had a stock split or stock dividend 
during the repurchase quarter.  Information for this variable comes from CRSP. 
Negative Earnings is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm had negative 
earnings for the repurchase quarter.  ASRxMiss is the product of ASR and an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if as if EPS is classified as Miss. ASRxJust Miss is the 
product of ASR and an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if as if EPS is classified 
as Just Miss. ASRx Just Beat is the product of ASR and an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if as if EPS is classified as Just Beat. Discretionary Accruals is a measure 
of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones method. Industry effects 
are based on the Fama and French 12 industry classifications. 
 
 In specification 1, we examine those variables that affect the number of shares 
outstanding.  We find that firms conducting an ASR have significantly greater upward 
movement relative to OMR firms.  The controls for equity issuance, stock splits, and 
negative earnings are signed as expected though only the split indicator shows 
significance.  In specification 2, we replace the ASR indicator with interactions between 
the ASR indicator and the as if earnings category.  Those firms that were expected to 
fall short of expectations that subsequently conduct an ASR are significantly more likely 
to increase their EPS performance relative to analyst expectations.  Specifications 3 
and 4 repeat the regressions with the inclusion of discretionary accruals.  Results 
remain consistent. 
3.4.3 Subsequent Earnings Performance 
 Because of the ongoing nature of repurchases in an OMR, firms choosing that 
repurchase form are likely to have an increased ability to make small changes in EPS 
through continued repurchases in subsequent quarters.  In contrast, ASR firms realize 
an immediate change in the number of shares outstanding in the announcing quarter.  
As such, it may be more difficult for ASR firms to meet expectations going forward.  
However, given the importance of consistently meeting expectations, the management 
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of ASR firms may choose a repurchase program size that meets their current needs 
without overly limiting their future options.  Alternatively, the finding by Aykol et. al 
(2014) that voluntary CEO turnover is significantly higher for ASR firms may indicate a 
willingness to maximize earnings in the present without regard for their successor’s 
ability to meet future expectations.  To discriminate between these possibilities we 
examine earnings performance against expectations in the four quarters subsequent to 
the repurchase quarter.  Our performance measure here is the difference between 
actual earnings and median analyst expectations scaled by those expectations.  Table 
3.5 presents the results.  We test for differences in means (medians) using a t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test).  
Table 3.5: Unexpected Earnings Subsequent to Repurchase 
Quarter 
 
N OMR N ASR Difference 
1 [Mean] 4774 -0.015 293 0.010 -0.026 
[Median] 
 
0.029 
 
0.036 -0.008 
2 
 
4613 0.004 277 -0.088 0.091 
  
0.026 
 
0.024 0.003 
3 
 
4450 0.064 262 -0.013 0.077 
  
0.026 
 
0.022 0.004 
4 
 
4247 -0.042 243 -0.163 0.121 
  
0.028 
 
0.020 0.007 
Table 3.5 shows unexpected earnings in the 4 quarters following repurchase.  
Unexpected earnings is measured as the difference between actual EPS and the 
median analyst EPS forecast scaled by the median forecast.  Differences in means 
(medians) are test using a t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum test). *, **, & *** represent 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, & 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
 In general, OMR firms have greater earnings surprises when measured by the 
means, but in quarters 1-3 following repurchase. ASR firms have better median 
performance.  However, neither repurchase form shows a significant advantage over 
the other.  Overall, the results indicate that the decision to repurchase shares using an 
ASR does not significantly affect the firm’s future ability to meet earnings expectations.
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3.4.4 Short-term Market Performance 
In Table 3.6, we display regression results for the short-term market reaction to 
the repurchase announcement.  In all specifications, the dependent variable is the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns centered about the announcement day.  Of primary 
interest is whether the market responds differently to an ASR than an OMR, and 
whether the market is able to determine whether the repurchase is perhaps being done 
to be able to meet analyst expectations.  In specifications 1-4, we include OMR and 
ASR repurchases while specifications 5 and 6 are restricted solely to ASRs.  As 
evidenced in all four of the specifications that contain both ASRs and OMRs, the market 
shows a markedly stronger response to the announcement of ASRs with a significance 
at the 1% level.  However, the market does not appear to be able to tell at 
announcement that the repurchase may be being undertaken in order to manipulate 
EPS as “Met EPS Through Repurchase” is not significant in any specification in which it 
is included. 
3.4.5 Long Run Market Performance 
We next turn to the long run market performance of repurchasing firms.  In 
measuring long run performance, we use the calendar time portfolio method advocated 
by Fama (1998).  Table 3.7 displays long run performance based on repurchase type.  
In panel A, we look the full sample of OMRs and ASRs combined.  In all time frames, 
we see significant abnormal performance when measured against the 3-factor model.  
In the 6 months subsequent to the repurchase announcement, there is an average 
monthly underperformance of 0.56% whereas the announcement month exhibits 
abnormal returns of nearly 1%.  This abnormal performance still manifests itself over the  
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Table 3.6: Short-term Stock Market Reaction to Repurchase Announcement 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw 
              
ASR 
0.0153*** 0.0155*** 0.0159*** 0.0162*** 
  (5.019) (5.066) (5.160) (5.237) 
  Met EPS Through 
Repurchase  
-0.00257 
 
-0.00380 0.00672 0.00314 
 
(-0.685) 
 
(-1.007) (1.095) (0.498) 
Return Std. Dev. 
0.878** 0.878** 0.504** 0.504** 0.490 0.239 
(2.503) (2.503) (2.395) (2.396) (1.353) (0.636) 
ln(Illiquidity) 
0.00410*** 0.00408*** 0.00508*** 0.00504*** 0.00443 0.00560 
(3.272) (3.243) (3.377) (3.344) (0.949) (1.027) 
ln(Assets) 
0.00486** 0.00485** 0.00532** 0.00532** 0.00403 0.00336 
(2.545) (2.544) (2.564) (2.566) (0.826) (0.545) 
Cash/Assets 
0.0168 0.0167 0.0117 0.0116 -0.0106 -0.00108 
(1.353) (1.342) (1.275) (1.255) (-0.460) (-0.0470) 
Program size (% of 
shares 
outstanding) 
3.43e-07 3.38e-07 3.33e-07 3.26e-07 0.00144 0.00184** 
(0.986) (0.973) (0.862) (0.845) (1.527) (2.075) 
Prior Stock 
Performance 
-0.00693 -0.00690 -0.0202 -0.0202 0.0270 0.0409 
(-0.381) (-0.380) (-1.309) (-1.309) (0.919) (1.410) 
ln(Market to Book) 
-0.00325 -0.00322 -0.000162 -0.000106 0.0197*** 0.0164** 
(-1.377) (-1.364) (-0.0713) (-0.0466) (2.648) (2.031) 
Takeover 
-0.0129 -0.0130 -0.0209 -0.0210 -0.00577 -0.00223 
(-0.804) (-0.810) (-1.539) (-1.547) (-0.514) (-0.179) 
Leverage 
0.00298 0.00296 0.00231 0.00226 -0.0444** -0.0344 
(0.538) (0.535) (0.514) (0.503) (-1.984) (-1.229) 
Free Cash Flow 
  
0.00685 0.00700 
 
0.0284 
  
(0.321) (0.329) 
 
(0.484) 
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(Table 3.6 continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw CAR3vw 
Free Cash Flow 
Std. Dev   
-0.000903 -0.000917 
 
0.0525 
  
(-0.133) (-0.135) 
 
(1.049) 
High-hedge 
  
0.00174 0.00192 
 
0.00422 
  
(0.397) (0.439) 
 
(0.519) 
Low-Hedge 
  
0.00542 0.00555 
 
0.0120 
  
(1.290) (1.322) 
 
(1.389) 
Constant 
0.0352** 0.0349** 0.0554*** 0.0548*** 0.0535 0.0710 
(2.190) (2.171) (3.147) (3.100) (0.756) (0.881) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,556 4,556 3,779 3,779 261 240 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.043 0.043 0.160 0.215 
Table 3.6 presents results of a linear regression in which the dependent variable is the three day cumulative abnormal 
return, measured against the value weighted market model, centered around the day of repurchase program 
announcement.  Assets is Compustat total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement.  
Ln(assets) is the natural log of total assets.  Cash/assets is cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to repurchase. Ln(Illiquidity) is the natural log of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  Return Std. Dev. 
is the standard deviation of returns over a period beginning 255 days prior to repurchase announcement and ending 46 
days prior.  The market value of equity is the product of  share price and number of shares outstanding at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to repurchase.  The book value of equity is determined as in Fama and French (1993).  Ln(market to 
book) is the natural log of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Leverage is the sum of long-term 
debt and total current liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement. 
Free cash flow is a measure of  free cash flow as in Acharya et al. (2007).  Free cash flow std. dev is the 5-year standard 
deviation of the free cash flow measure.  High-hedge is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 3-year 
correlation between free cash flow and 3 digit sic industry median research and development expense is less than -0.2.  
Low-hedge is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 3 year correlation between free cash flow and 3 digit sic 
industry median research and development expense is greater than 0.2. All free cash flow measures are at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement. Takeover is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
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repurchasing firm was the target of a takeover attempt in the 6 months preceding the 
repurchase announcement.  Takeover attempts are obtained from the SDC mergers 
and acquisitions database. Program size is the number of shares authorized for 
repurchase divided by the number of shares outstanding and is taken from SDC. Prior 
stock performance is the market model cumulative abnormal returns over days -44 
through -4 prior to the repurchase announcement. Industry effects are based on the 
Fama and French 12 industry classifications.  Met EPS through repurchase is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 for firms that met earnings expectations, but would 
have been expected to fail to do so in the absence of repurchase. 
 
subsequent three years although the magnitude falls.  Over the first, second, and third 
years following repurchase announcement, monthly abnormal returns average 0.29%, 
0.23%, and 0.21% respectively.  
Table 3.7: Long Run Stock Performance By Repurchase Type 
 
Months Relative to Repurchase Announcement 
 (-6 , -1) (0,0) (1 , 12) (1 , 24) (1 , 36) 
Panel A: Full Sample 
α -0.56% 0.97% 0.29% 0.23% 0.21% 
 
(-7.48***) (3.90***) (3.03***) (2.44***) (2.18**) 
β 0.934 1.1239 0.915 0.9285 0.9405 
 
(46.06***) (16.89***) (35.90***) (37.58***) (26.56***) 
s 0.5243 0.5138 0.5383 0.5489 0.5577 
 
(14.67***) 4.25*** (11.58***) (12.18***) (9.82***) 
h -0.0478 -0.2128 0.0877 0.1985 0.2355 
 
(-1.40*) (-1.90*) (2.04**) (4.76***) (4.12***) 
R2 96.66% 78.46% 95.06% 95.65% 95.53% 
F 1284.3*** 155.39*** 815.01*** 929.78*** 904.62***    
N 6489 6493 6459 6463 6466 
      Panel B: OMR 
α -0.59% 0.90% 0.29% 0.23% 0.20% 
 
(-7.77***) (3.55***) (3.03***) (2.43***) (2.12**) 
β 0.931 1.1291 0.9108 0.9274 0.9394 
 
(45.22***) (16.69***) (35.65***) (37.37***) (36.63***) 
s 0.5343 0.5313 0.5458 0.5561 0.5675 
 
(14.73***) (4.32***) (11.71***) (12.29***) (12.13***) 
h -0.0403 -0.1961 0.0887 0.1967 0.2326 
 
(-1.16) (-1.72*) (2.06**) (4.70***) (5.38***) 
R2 96.58% 78.25% 95.03% 95.62% 95.51% 
F 1250.1*** 153.46*** 809.10*** 923.28*** 900.18*** 
N 6175 6179 6150 6154 6157 
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(Table 3.7 continued) 
 
Months Relative to Repurchase Announcement 
 (-6 , -1) (0,0) (1 , 12) (1 , 24) (1 , 36) 
Panel C: ASR 
α -0.09% 2.49% 0.29% 0.15% 0.22% 
 
(-0.30) (5.26***) (1.30*) (0.91) (1.34*) 
β 0.9981 0.6895 1.0341 0.9327 0.9545 
 
(13.11***) (5.41***) (17.30***) (21.53*** ) (22.17***) 
s 0.3165 0.0502 0.3092 0.3241 0.3012 
 
(2.36**) (0.22) (2.84***) (4.10***) (3.84***) 
h -0.1096 -0.3493 0.1065 0.2682 0.3265 
 
(-0.86) (-1.42*) (1.06) (3.67***) (4.50***) 
R2 66.69% 27.42% 79.26% 86.66% 87.40% 
F 88.75*** 11.84*** 161.78*** 275.06*** 293.59*** 
N 314 314 309 309 309 
Table 3.7 presents long-term stock performance for sample firms based upon the 
calendar time portfolio method using the Fama French 3 factor model.  Panel A 
presents results for the full sample while Panel’s B and C represent open market 
repurchase observations and accelerated share repurchase observations respectively. 
 
Results solely for OMRs are contained in Panel B.  Results for OMRs are 
substantially similar to those of the full sample, likely due to their making up the bulk of 
the sample.  Panel C shows results for ASRs.  Unlike the sample as a whole or OMRs 
specifically, ASRs do not display the same poor performance in the months leading up 
to the announcement.  While still negative, the -0.09% monthly abnormal returns for 
ASRs are not statistically significant and are less than one-sixth the magnitude of the 
comparable figure for the sample as a whole.  As evidenced in the short-term-results, 
the abnormal returns for the announcement month are much greater for ASRs.  Results 
for the years following the announcement are only weakly significant for the one and 
three year time frames and not at all for the two year window.  Still, the magnitude of 
abnormal performance is identical in the year following the repurchase announcement 
to the OMR firms.  Two-year performance is slightly lower while three-year performance 
is slightly higher. 
 94 
In Table 3.8, we look at long-term stock performance relative to EPS 
expectations.  Panel A contains results for those firms expected to meet analysts 
forecasts even if they had not repurchased.  Panel B shows results for those firms that 
we expect would have fallen short of expectations in the absence of a repurchase while 
Panel C is for those firms that did fail to meet EPS expectations.  In the 6 months prior 
to the repurchase announcement, all firms exhibit significantly negative monthly 
abnormal performance though the magnitudes differ greatly.  For those firms expected 
to meet earnings, this figure is -0.36%.  The magnitude increases to -1.06% for those 
firms that miss earnings while those needing a repurchase to meet expectations fall in 
between.  For the month of announcement, the abnormal return is only significant (and 
positive) for those firms expected to meet earnings.  For the remaining firms, the result 
is negative but not significantly so. 
Table 3.8: Long Run Stock Performance by Earnings Performance Relative to EPS 
Expectations 
 
 
Months Relative to Repurchase Announcement 
  (-6 , -1) (0,0) (1 , 12) (1 , 24) (1 , 36) 
Panel A: Expected to Meet EPS Without Repurchase 
α -0.36% 1.58% 0.57% 0.40% 0.34% 
 
(-4.55***) (5.36***) (6.42***) (4.58***) (3.63***) 
β 0.9288 1.1642 0.9106 0.9141 0.9249 
 
(43.17***) (14.76***) (38.38***) (38.87***) (37.01***) 
s 0.5055 0.5112 0.4938 0.5171 0.5268 
 
(13.34***) (3.57***) (11.41***) (12.06***) (11.56***) 
h -0.0513 -0.223 0.0273 0.1161 0.1762 
 
(-1.42) (-1.68*) (0.68) (2.93***) (4.18***) 
R2 96.18% 73.32% 95.46% 95.75% 95.43% 
F 1115.7*** 117.28*** 889.81*** 952.96*** 883.96*** 
N 4167 4168 4149 4153 4156 
      Panel B: Met EPS Through Repurchase 
α -0.75% -0.33% -0.06% 0.04% 0.11% 
 
(-3.67***) (-0.62) (-0.32) (0.27) (0.75) 
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(Table 3.8 continued) 
 
Months Relative to Repurchase Announcement 
 (-6 , -1) (0,0) (1 , 12) (1 , 24) (1 , 36) 
β 0.8603 1.0903 0.8458 0.9012 0.9565 
 
(15.71***) (7.65***) (18.64***) (22.23***) (23.66***) 
s 0.4872 0.4862 0.6957 0.5853 0.5662 
 
(5.05***) (1.90*) (8.41***) (7.92***) (7.68***) 
h -0.0462 0.1931 0.0537 0.2041 0.191 
 
(-0.50) (0.81) (0.70) (2.99***) (2.80***) 
R2 77.17% 45.76% 85.48% 88.85% 89.66% 
F 149.83*** 32.91*** 249.24*** 337.47*** 367.01*** 
N 470 470 470 470 470 
      Panel C: Missed EPS 
α -1.06% -0.33% -0.37% -0.21% -0.13% 
 
(-8.23***) (-0.81) (-2.48**) (-1.61) (-1.10) 
β 0.9374 0.9838 0.9118 0.9555 0.9622 
 
(27.01***) (9.02***) (23.21***) (27.36***) (30.14***) 
s 0.5721 0.5672 0.6351 0.6252 0.6446 
 
(9.36***) (2.86***) (8.86***) (9.82***) (11.07***) 
h -0.0829 -0.3342 0.2412 0.3801 0.3801 
 
(1.42) (-1.82*) (3.64***) (6.45***) (7.06***) 
R2 91.05% 52.03% 90.03% 92.79% 94.03% 
F 450.79*** 46.28*** 382.48*** 544.98*** 666.45*** 
N 1684 1686 1671 1671 1671 
Table 3.8 presents long-term stock performance for sample firms based upon the 
calendar time portfolio method using the Fama French 3 factor model.  Panel A 
presents results for those firms which met and were expected to meet quarterly 
earnings expectations without the reduction in shares outstanding due to repurchase. 
Panel B contains results for those firms that met earnings expectations but would have 
been expected to miss those expectations without the reduction in shares outstanding 
caused by repurchase. Panel C firms failed to meet earnings expectations. 
 
Following the repurchase announcement, results vary for each firm type.  Those 
firms that were expected to meet expectations enjoy positive abnormal returns over the 
following three years.  Those firms that required a repurchase to meet expectations 
exhibit insignificant abnormal performance.  Firms that miss analysts’ expectations have 
significantly negative monthly abnormal returns for the year following the repurchase 
announcement of -0.37%.  In summation, firms that use repurchases to meet 
expectations do not suffer the negative effects in the year following repurchase 
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associated with missing expectations, but they don’t enjoy the positive abnormal returns 
accrued by those higher quality firms that are able to meet expectations regardless of 
their repurchase decision.   
3.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter we analyze ASRs with a particular eye towards their use in 
influencing the number of shares outstanding in a way that might allow firms to meet 
EPS expectations that would not have been able to do so without a repurchase.  We 
find that firms that would be expected to fall two or more cents shy of median 
expectations are very significantly more likely to elect an ASR while those firms that 
would be expected to exceed earnings by two or more cents are weakly significantly 
less likely to elect an ASR.  We also find that subsequent earnings performance is not 
significantly different in the four quarters following the repurchase announcement 
regardless of the form of repurchase undertaken.  ASR announcements are greeted by 
higher three day abnormal returns, but the market does not appear to be able to tell at 
the time of repurchase announcement that the repurchase is possibly EPS 
manipulative.  However, in the three years following the repurchase announcement, 
potentially manipulative repurchasers do not receive the positive abnormal returns that 
accrue to those who would have been expected to meet expectations without 
repurchase, but they also don’t suffer the negative abnormal returns that plague those 
missing analysts’ expectations. 
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Chapter 4. Conclusions 
 The two essays that constitute this dissertation explore equity transactions that 
are in one case designed to raise capital and, in the other, disburse capital back to the 
firm’s shareholders.  Chapter 2 concerns the raising of capital through the IPO process 
and more specifically the lockup protections put in place by the underwriting firm to limit 
the selling of shares by pre-IPO shareholders.  The proportion of primary shares sold in 
the offering is inversely related with the decision to implement multiple lockups while 
book-to-market value and a dual class share structure are positively correlated with a 
staged lockup arrangement.  In contrast with the prevailing wisdom regarding single 
lockups, lockup releases beyond the first do not produce reliably negative abnormal 
returns.  Additionally, firms with multiple lockups underperform single lockup firms over 
the three years following IPO but not in the one or two year subperiods.   
 Our second essay addresses accelerated share repurchases, an emerging 
method of returning cash to stockholders.  Unlike the more traditional open market 
repurchase, an ASR commits the firm to its repurchase and consequently provides a 
much more immediate reduction in the number of shares outstanding.  Our evidence 
shows that this form of repurchase is associated with firms meeting analyst’s earnings 
expectation that would not have done so in the absence of the repurchase.  The change 
in meeting or not meeting earnings is not explained by other behavior that could 
possibly impact EPS such as discretionary accruals.  Although the market seems 
indifferent to possibly manipulative behavior at the time the repurchase is announced, 
manipulative repurchasers suffer poorer long-term stock performance than their non-
manipulative peers.  
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Appendix. Prospectus Excerpts 
 The following excerpts come from IPO prospectuses filed with the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and made available to the public through the SEC’s 
website, sec.gov. 
A.1 Visa 
We begin by looking at Visa, an example of the typical 180-day single lockup.  
We first show the relevant paragraph from the “Shares Eligible for Future Sale” section 
of the prospectus.   
 “We and our directors and executive officers are subject to lock-up agreements 
under which we and they have agreed not to transfer or dispose of, directly or indirectly, 
any common stock or any securities convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for 
common stock for 180 days after the date of this prospectus. J.P. Morgan Securities 
Inc. and Goldman, Sachs & Co. may, in their sole discretion, at any time and without 
prior notice or announcement, release all or any portion of shares subject to the lock-up 
agreements.” 
 
This simple phrasing conveys the essence of the lockup agreement: the 
requirement to retain existing holdings, the length of the lockup, and the fact that the 
underwriter imposes the lockup agreement.  The next quotation comes from the 
“Underwriting” section of Visa’s prospectus and contains more detail about the 
prohibitions imposed by the underwriter. 
“We have agreed that, for a period of 180 days after the date of this prospectus, 
without the prior written consent of J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and Goldman, Sachs & 
Co. and subject to certain exceptions, we will not offer, pledge, announce the intention 
to sell, sell, contract to sell, sell any option or contract to purchase, purchase any option 
or contract to sell, grant any option, right or warrant to purchase or otherwise transfer or 
dispose of, directly or indirectly, any shares of class A common stock or any securities 
convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for class A common stock or enter into 
any swap or other agreement that transfers, in whole or in part, any of the economic 
consequences of ownership of class A common stock, whether any such transaction is 
to be settled by delivery of class A common stock or such other securities, in cash or 
otherwise, other than the class A common stock to be sold in this offering, awards 
made, and shares of class A common stock issued upon the exercise of options 
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granted, under our outstanding equity incentive compensation plans, and issuances of 
shares of class A common stock in an amount up to 5% of the number of shares 
purchased under the underwriting agreement as consideration or partial consideration 
for an acquisition or a joint venture (as long as J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. receive a signed lockup agreement for the balance of the lockup 
period from each recipient of such shares). In addition, each of our directors and 
executive officers has agreed that, for the same 180-day lock-up period, without the 
prior written consent of J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and Goldman, Sachs & Co. and 
subject to certain exceptions, he or she will not offer, pledge, announce the intention to 
sell, sell, contract to sell, sell any option or contract to purchase, purchase any option or 
contract to sell, grant any option, right or warrant to purchase, or otherwise transfer or 
dispose of, directly or indirectly, any shares of class A common stock or any securities 
convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for class A common stock (including 
without limitation, class A common stock which may be deemed to be beneficially 
owned in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and securities which may be issued upon exercise of a stock option or 
warrant), or enter into any swap or other agreement that transfers, in whole or in part, 
any of the economic consequences of ownership of the class A common stock, whether 
any such transaction is to be settled by delivery of class A common stock or such other 
securities, in cash or otherwise. In addition, we have agreed that, for the same 180-day 
lock-up period, without the prior written consent of J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. and 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., our board of directors will not waive any of the restrictions on 
transfer binding the shares of class B and class C common stock, as described under 
“Description of Capital Stock—Transfer Restrictions.” 
 
The 180-day lock-up period is subject to extension if during the last 17 days of the 180-
day lock-up period, we issue an earnings release or material news or a material event 
relating to us occurs; or prior to the expiration of the 180-day lock-up period, we 
announce that we will release earnings results during the 16-day period beginning on 
the last day of the 180-day lock-up period. In such a case, the lock-up restrictions will 
continue to apply until the expiration of the 18-day period beginning on the issuance of 
the earnings release or the occurrence of the material news or material event.” 
 
A.2 Global Traffic Network 
Next we have the lockup for Global Traffic Network, which is a single lockup firm 
but with a longer one-year lockup period. We begin with the relevant text from the 
“Shares Eligible for Future Sale” section of the prospectus. Here the prospectus is more 
explicit in the text regarding the number of shares subject to the agreement.  As with 
Visa, the basic nature of the lockup is specified, but this section is more detailed with 
regard to the prohibited activities. 
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“Our directors, executive officers, certain other officers and all of our current 
stockholders have agreed not to offer, sell, contract to sell, swap, make any short sale 
of, pledge, establish an open “put equivalent position” within the meaning of Rule 16a-
1(h) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) with 
respect to, grant any option to purchase or otherwise dispose of, or publicly announce 
his, her or its intention to do any of the foregoing with respect to, any shares of common 
stock, or any securities convertible into, or exercisable or exchangeable for, any shares 
of common stock for a period of 12 months after the date of this prospectus without the 
prior written consent of the Underwriter. We have entered into a similar agreement with 
the Underwriter that we will not issue additional shares (with the exception of shares 
pursuant to the over-allotment option) of our common stock before the end of the 
180 day period following the date of this prospectus, other than with respect to our 
issuing shares pursuant to employee benefit plans, qualified option plans or other 
employee compensation plans already in existence, or pursuant to currently outstanding 
options, warrants or other rights to acquire shares of our common stock. See 
“Underwriting — Lock Up Agreement.” After the expiration of the 12-month “lock-up” 
period, our stockholders and option holders will be entitled to dispose of their shares 
upon compliance with applicable securities laws. After this lock-up period, 
3,800,000 shares of our common stock will be eligible for sale without limitation and 
8,500,000 shares of our common stock will be eligible for sale subject to the volume, 
manner of sale and other limitations under Rule 144.” 
 
Next we show the relevant portion of the “Underwriting” section of the 
prospectus.   
“Except as noted below, our directors, executive officers and current stockholders have 
agreed with the Underwriter that for a period of 12 months following the date of this 
prospectus, they will not offer, sell, assign, transfer, pledge, contract to sell or otherwise 
dispose of or hedge any of our shares of common stock or any securities convertible 
into or exchangeable for our shares of common stock. We have entered into a similar 
agreement with the Underwriter that we will not issue additional shares (with the 
exception of shares pursuant to the over-allotment option) of our common stock before 
the end of the 180 day period following the date of this prospectus, other than with 
respect to our issuing shares pursuant to employee benefit plans, qualified option plans 
or other employee compensation plans already in existence, or pursuant to currently 
outstanding options, warrants or other rights to acquire shares of our common stock. 
The Underwriter may, in its sole discretion, at any time without prior notice, release all 
or any portion of the shares from the restrictions in any such agreements. In 
determining whether to release shares from the restrictions, the Underwriter may 
consider, among other factors, the financial circumstances applicable to a director’s, 
executive officer’s or stockholder’s request to release shares and the number of shares 
that such director, executive officer or stockholder requests to be released. There are 
no agreements between the Underwriter and us or any of our directors, executive 
officers or stockholders releasing us or them from such agreements before the 
expiration of the applicable period.” 
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A.3 Cafepress 
We next show a case of multiple lockups.  Interestingly in this case, the subjects 
of the extended lockup period are not executives but large block-holders.  Those two 
block-holders are themselves subject to two lockup periods such that they are unable to 
fully dispose of their shares until the expiration of the second lockup period.  We first 
show the relevant text from the “Shares Eligible for Future Sale”. 
“Our directors, executive officers and holders of substantially all of our outstanding 
common stock (on a fully-diluted basis as of December 31, 2011 without giving effect to 
this offering) have agreed with limited exceptions that they will not sell any shares of 
common stock owned by them without the prior written consent of J.P. Morgan 
Securities LLC and Jefferies & Company, Inc., on behalf of the underwriters, for a 
period of 180 days from the date of this prospectus. In addition, Fred E. Durham III and 
Maheesh Jain, two of our greater than 5% stockholders, have agreed to the same 
restrictions described above for a period of 360 days from the date of this prospectus 
with respect to 1,312,718 and 1,157,508 shares held beneficially by them as of 
December 31, 2011, respectively, (or 975,218 and 820,008 shares, assuming the 
underwriters exercise their over-allotment option in full) and for a period of 630 days 
from the date of this prospectus with respect to 850,336 and 748,794 shares held 
beneficially by them as of December 31, 2011, respectively. However, subject to certain 
exceptions, in the event that either: 
 during the last 17 days of the restricted period, we issue an earnings release or 
material news or a material event relating to us occurs, or 
 prior to the expiration of the restricted period, we announce that we will release 
earnings results during the 16-day period beginning on the last day of the 
restricted period, 
 
then in either case the expiration of the restricted period will be extended until the 
expiration of the 18-day period beginning on the date of the issuance of an earnings 
release or the occurrence of the material news or event, as applicable, unless J.P. 
Morgan Securities LLC and Jefferies & Company, Inc. waive, in writing, such an 
extension. Subject to certain exceptions, at any time and without public notice, J.P. 
Morgan Securities LLC and Jefferies & Company, Inc. may in their sole discretion 
release some or all of the securities from these lock-up agreements. To the extent 
shares are released before the expiration of the lock-up period and these shares are 
sold into the market, the market price of our common stock could decline. 
 
See “Underwriting” for a more complete description of the lock-up agreements.” 
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The “Underwriting” section reiterates much of the same information but is much 
more explicit with regards to the activities prohibited by the lockup provision. 
“Our directors and executive officers and holders of substantially all of our outstanding 
common stock (on a fully-diluted basis as of December 31, 2011 without giving effect to 
this offering) have also agreed that for a period of 180 days after the date of this 
prospectus, may not, without the prior written consent of J.P. Morgan Securities LLC 
and Jefferies & Company, Inc., (1) offer, pledge, sell, contract to sell, sell any option or 
contract to purchase, purchase any option or contract to sell, grant any option, right or 
warrant to purchase, or otherwise transfer or dispose of, directly or indirectly, any 
shares of our common stock or any securities convertible into or exercisable or 
exchangeable for our common stock (including, without limitation, common stock or 
such other securities which may be deemed to be beneficially owned by such directors, 
executive officers, or stockholders in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
SEC and securities which may be issued upon exercise of a stock option or warrant) or 
(2) enter into any swap or other agreement that transfers, in whole or in part, any of the 
economic consequences of ownership of the common stock or such other securities, 
whether any such transaction described in clause (1) or (2) above is to be settled by 
delivery of common stock or such other securities, in cash or otherwise, or (3) make any 
demand for or exercise any right with respect to the registration of any shares of our 
common stock or any security convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for our 
common stock. In addition, Fred E. Durham III and Maheesh Jain, two of our greater 
than 5% stockholders, have agreed to the same restrictions described above for a 
period of 360 days from the date of this prospectus with respect to 1,312,718 and 
1,157,508 shares held beneficially by them as of December 31, 2011, respectively, (or 
975,218 and 820,008 shares, assuming the underwriters exercise their over-allotment 
option in full) and for a period of 630 days from the date of this prospectus with respect 
to 850,336 and 748,794 shares held beneficially by them as of December 31, 2011, 
respectively. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if (1) during the last 17 days of the 
restricted period, we issue an earnings release or material news or a material event 
relating to our company occurs; or (2) prior to the expiration of the restricted period, we 
announce that we will release earnings results during the 16-day period beginning on 
the last day of the restricted period, the restrictions described above shall in certain 
cases continue to apply until the expiration of the 18-day period beginning on the 
issuance of the earnings release or the occurrence of the material news or material 
event. These restrictions generally shall not apply to: (a) the sale of shares of our 
common stock in this offering; (b) transfers of shares of our common stock or any 
security convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for our common stock as a 
bona fide gift or gifts; (c) distributions of shares of our common stock or any security 
convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable for our common stock to members, 
stockholders, affiliates, subsidiaries, limited partners or general partners of the 
stockholder; (d) transfers of shares of our common stock or any security convertible into 
or exercisable or exchangeable for common stock by will or intestate succession to an 
immediate family member of the officer, director or stockholder or to a trust, the 
beneficiaries of which are exclusively the officer, director, or stockholder or their 
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immediate family members; (e) transactions relating to shares of our common stock 
acquired in open market transactions after the completion of this offering; provided that 
in the case of any transfer or distribution pursuant to clause (b), (c) or (d), each donee 
or distributee execute sand delivers to the representatives a lock-up agreement; and 
provided, further, that in the case of any transfer, distribution or transaction pursuant to 
clause (b), (c), (d) or (e), no filing by any party under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act 
reporting a reduction in beneficial ownership, and no other similar public announcement, 
will be required or will be made voluntarily in connection with such transfer, distribution 
or transaction during the restricted period (other than a filing on a Form 5 made after the 
expiration of the restricted period); (f) the “net” exercise of outstanding options in 
accordance with their terms and the surrender of shares of stock in lieu of payment in 
cash of any tax withholding obligation, provided that we, in each case, become the 
owner of the shares of our common stock surrendered in the net exercise and that such 
shares will be subject to the lock-up provisions referred to in the immediately preceding 
paragraph; (g) the exercise for cash, including payment in cash of any tax withholding 
obligation, of any options to acquire shares of our common stock, provided that any 
shares of our common stock acquired pursuant to clause (f) or (h) will be subject to 
these lock-up provisions; provided, further that with respect to clause (f) or (g), no filing 
under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, reporting a reduction in beneficial ownership, 
and no other similar public announcement, will be required or will be made voluntarily 
during the restricted period (other than a filing on a Form 5 made after the expiration of 
the restricted period); or (h) the establishment of a trading plan pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 
under the Exchange Act for the transfer or sale of shares of our common stock, 
provided that such plan does not provide for the sale or transfer of our common stock 
during the restricted period, and provided further, that no filing by any party under the 
Exchange Act or other public announcement will be required in connection with the 
entering into of any such trading plan during the restricted period.” 
 
A.4 Avalon Pharmaceuticals 
We next show an example of a firm with three lockup periods.  The CEO agrees 
to the longest lockup period of 18 months, other executives are locked up for 12 
months, and other pre-IPO shareholders are subject to the standard 180-day lockup. 
The following quote comes from the “Shares Eligible for Future Sale” section of the 
prospectus. For this firm, the information in the “Underwriting” section is largely 
redundant, so we omit it for brevity. 
      “Our officers and directors, stockholders, and option and warrant holders holding 
over 99% of our fully diluted equity have signed lock-up agreements under which they 
agreed not to offer, sell, pledge, contract to sell, sell short, grant any option in or 
otherwise dispose of, or enter into any hedging transaction with respect to, any shares 
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of our common stock or any securities convertible into or exercisable or exchangeable 
for shares of our common stock beneficially owned by them, for specified periods, 
subject to extensions in certain cases. Our Chief Executive Officer has agreed to a lock-
up period of 18 months after the date of this prospectus and our other executive officers 
have agreed to a lock-up period of one year. All other signatories have agreed to a lock-
up period of 180 days. However, shares acquired in this offering or after its conclusion 
by signatories to the lock-up agreements are subject to a lock-up period expiring 
90 days after the date of this prospectus. The foregoing does not prohibit open market 
purchases of our common stock by such holders after the completion of this offering, 
and transfers or dispositions by our officers, directors and stockholders can be made 
sooner: 
 
   
  •  with the written consent of WR Hambrecht + Co, LLC; or 
    
  •  as a bona fide gift.” 
 
A.5 Facebook 
Finally, we show a case where there are numerous lockup expirations. From the 
“Shares Eligible for Future Sale” section: 
“Our officers, directors, employees, and substantially all of our stockholders have 
agreed with the underwriters or us, not to dispose of any of our common stock or 
securities convertible into or exchangeable for shares of our common stock for specified 
periods of time after the date of this prospectus, except with the prior written consent of 
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC or us, as applicable. Under the terms of their lock-up 
agreements with the underwriters, the selling stockholders, other than Mr. Zuckerberg, 
are eligible to sell up to 271,123,815 shares of our common stock in the aggregate on 
the date that is 91 days after the date of this prospectus, up to 711,494,326 shares of 
our common stock in the aggregate on the date that is 181 days after the date of this 
prospectus, and the remaining shares of our common stock held by them 211 days after 
the date of this prospectus. Under the terms of their lock-up agreement with the 
underwriters, our directors, our executive officers, and certain stockholders not selling 
shares in this offering are eligible to sell shares of our common stock 181 days after the 
date of this prospectus, subject to certain exceptions as described in “Underwriting.” All 
other holders of our common stock, RSUs and options have previously entered into 
market standoff agreements with us not to sell or otherwise transfer any of their 
common stock or securities convertible into or exchangeable for shares of common 
stock for a period that extends through 180 days after the date of this prospectus. We 
intend to waive this provision to allow our directors and then current employees to sell 
shares held by them or shares subject to RSUs or stock options on a date that is 
between 151 and 180 days after the date of this prospectus. In addition, Mail.ru Group 
Limited and DST Global Limited and their respective affiliates have entered into an 
agreement with us to not sell their shares for certain periods of time ranging from 90 
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days to 365 days following the date of this prospectus. See “Related Party 
Transactions—Conversion Agreement” for additional information about this agreement. 
  
In addition, we have agreed with our underwriters not to sell any shares of our common 
stock or securities convertible into or exchangeable for shares of our common stock for 
a period of 180 days after the date of this prospectus, subject to certain exceptions, 
including an exception that would permit us to raise capital in an underwritten offering to 
fund our tax withholding and remittance obligations in connection with the initial 
settlement of RSUs granted prior to January 1, 2011. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC may, 
with our prior written consent, at any time, waive these restrictions. 
  
See “Underwriting” for a more complete description of the lock-up agreements that we 
and our directors, executive officers, and the selling stockholders have entered into with 
the underwriters.” 
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